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9%	 for	 the	 past	 three	 decades,	 scholarship	 pertaining	 to	 the	 rise	 of	 China	 has	
flourished.	Amidst	China’s	heightened	 sense	of	 global	hegemony,	 the	 rising	power	
has	 indisputably	maneuvered	 itself	 closer	 to	 African	 states	 since	 the	 dawn	 of	 the	
21st	century.	Since	2000,	Chinese	net	trade	with	African	states	has	grown	from	$10	
billion	 to	 more	 than	 $180	 billion	 in	 2012,	 surpassing	 the	 United	 States	 as	 the	
continent’s	 biggest	 trading	 partner.1	Moreover,	 outward	 foreign	 direct	 investment	
from	 China	 to	 Africa	 has	 grown	 from	 $9	 billion	 in	 2000	 to	 $62	 billion	 in	 2008.2	





million	Chinese	 citizens	estimated	 to	be	abroad,	over	one	million	of	 these	 citizens	
are	in	Africa.3		
	 The	special	relationship	China	has	cultivated	with	its	African	counterparts	is	
significant	 insofar	 that	 China-Africa	 area	 studies	 is	 emerging	 as	 a	 new	 field	 of	
research	 that	merits	 greater	 attention,	 as	 argued	by	Monson	and	Rupp.4		The	 role	
that	 China	 will	 play	 on	 the	 African	 continent	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 reshape	 global	
power	 dynamics.	 If	 China	 is	 able	 to	 forge	 closer	 security,	 military,	 and	 political	
relations	with	African	states,	 extract	precious	 resources	 from	 these	countries,	 and	
take	advantage	of	the	growing	consumer	market	in	Africa,	it	will	constitute	China’s	
deepest	foray	into	international	politics	outside	of	the	East	Asian	region,	and	will	be	
the	primary	pillar	of	China’s	 “Go	Global”	 strategy	 (zou	chuqu	zhanlue),	 initiated	 in	
1999.	In	short,	the	future	dynamics	of	Sino-African	relations	could	reveal	important	
insights	 that	 indicate	 a	 slow	 shift	 in	 global	 power	 dynamics,	 and	 possibly	 the	
creation	of	a	bipolar	world	order,	as	argued	by	Rinehart	and	Glitter.5		
Consequently,	 many	 scholars	 across	 a	 variety	 of	 disciplines,	 such	 as	 Shinn	
and	Eisenman,	are	attempting	to	unveil	the	unique	nature	of	Sino-African	relations,	
and	research	covers	a	vast	range	of	themes,	including	historical	accounts	of	Chinese	
involvement	 on	 the	 continent,	 present	 policy	 engagements	 between	 China	 and	 its	
African	 counterparts,	 and	 the	 consequences	of	 augmented	Sino-African	 relations.	6		
Most	 scholars	 engaged	 in	 Sino-African	 area	 studies	 are	 concerned	 with	








African	 states,	 as	 well	 as	 evaluating	 how	 Chinese	 policies	 impact	 African	 regime	
stability,	 cultural	 integration,	 development,	 and	 state	 capacity.	 Although	 Sino-
African	relations	are	a	relatively	new,	yet	expanding,	area	of	scholarship,	there	are	





reviews	 these	 schools	 of	 thought	 on	 Sino-African	 studies	 and	 their	 branch	 sub-
theories,	 illustrating	 the	 difficulty	 in	 attempting	 to	 categorize	 all	 Sino-African	
engagements	 under	 just	 one	 of	 these	 theoretical	 approaches.	 This	 chapter	 also	
introduces	the	concept	of	non-interference,	which	will	be	used	in	Chapter	2	as	a	new	
mode	 of	 understanding	 Sino-African	 relations.	 One	 important	 argument	 of	 this	
thesis	 is	 that	 if	 China’s	 non-interference	 policy	 is	 shown	 to	 be	 more	 than	 just	
Communist	 Party	 rhetoric	 in	 its	 foreign	 policy,	 then	most	 existing	 approaches	 to	
Sino-African	 studies	 have	 to	 be	 seriously	 reconsidered.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 three	
existing	 approaches	 (and	 key	 sub-schools	 within	 them)	 assume	 that	 China	 is	
executing	 a	 grand	 and	 highly	 interventionist	 strategy,	 but	 differs	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
ultimate	 target	of	China’s	strategy	(e.g.	United	States,	 individual	African	countries)	
and	 contrast	 in	 terms	 of	 China’s	 underlying	 motivations	 and	 incentives	 (e.g.	
economic	 gain,	 political	 or	military	 power,	 etc.).	 One	 problem	 is	 that	 China	 never	
explicitly	 declares	 a	 grand	 strategy	 in	 public	 nor	 reveals	 its	 “true,”	 underlying	
motivations.	Thus,	these	are	most	often	read	into	what	is	empirically	observable.	By	
	 6	
contrast,	 “non-interference”	 –	 although	 sometimes	 vague	 and	 requiring	 much	
contextualization	within	a	Chinese	context	–	is	a	long-standing	and	declared	policy	
of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	(PRC)	since	1955.	Indeed,	utilizing	comprehensive	
datasets	 on	 China’s	 voting	 record	 in	 United	Nations	 resolutions	 (formal,	 political-
institutional	channels),	of	which	1,217	resolutions	were	read,	coded,	and	analyzed	
in	Chapter	3,	and	the	behavior	of	Chinese	multinational	enterprises	(MNEs)	in	Africa	






of	 thought	 in	 terms	 of	 defining	 Sino-African	 relations	 as	 an	 example	 of:	 (1)	 21st	
century	Chinese	Imperialism,	(2)	Great	Power	Rivalry	and	the	coming	of	a	new	cold	
war	 in	 which	 Chinese	 foreign	 policy	 is	 governed	 by	 countering	 and	 undermining	
Western	 policy	 objectives,	 or	 (3)	 in	 purely	 economic	 terms,	 though	 scholars	
disagree	over	 the	benefits	 that	 accrue	 to	African	countries.	Moreover,	within	each	
school	 of	 thought,	 there	 is	 a	 group	 of	 scholars	 who	 either	 support	 or	 reject	 that	







The	Chinese	 Imperialism	 school	 of	 understanding	Chinese	 actions	 in	Africa	
consists	of	two	distinct	groups	of	researchers.	The	first	group	of	‘imperial’	thinkers	
holds	that	China	is	a	rising	imperial	power	in	Africa.		They	argue	that	Beijing	seeks	




arms	 deals	 and	 gifts	 to	 pariah	 regimes	 that	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 make	 African	
militaries	 reliant	 upon	 and	 even	 dominated	 by	 Chinese	 economic,	 political,	 and	
military	 policies.7	Many	 African	 states	 are	 coined	 as	 puppet	 governments	 for	 the	
PRC	 based	 on	 this	 interpretation	 and	 China	 is	 viewed	 as	 a	 dominating	 power	 in	
Africa.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 advocates	 against	 this	 imperialist	 argument,	 like	 Sun,	




Scholars	 who	 support	 the	 claim	 that	 China	 is	 invested	 in	 a	 Great	 Power	
Rivalry	 contend	 that	 Chinese	 engagements	 with	 African	 states	 should	 be	 viewed	







the	 ultimate	 object	 of	 political	 struggle	 for	 China	 is	 “the	West”	 as	 part	 of	 a	 global	
strategy,	 whereas	 in	 imperialism,	 it	 is	 restricted	 to	 just	 the	 African	 region	 or	
individual	 countries.	 These	 adherents	 view	 China	 as	 a	 direct	 threat	 to	 the	 future	
success	of	Western	economic	and	political	growth	around	the	world,	suggesting	that	
Beijing	 is	 systematically	 executing	 a	 foreign	 policy	 agenda	 to	 thwart	 Western	
interests.	Yet,	researchers	arguing	against	the	Great	Power	Rivalry	interpretation	of	




While	 both	 the	 Chinese	 Imperialism	 school	 and	 the	 Great	 Power	 Rivalry	
school	 focus	 on	 Chinese	 strategies,	 motivations,	 and	 goals,	 the	 ‘Economic	
Engagement’	 school	 is	 equally	 focused	 on	 the	 consequences	 of	 China’s	 economic	
actions	on	the	continent.		Researchers	who	both	support	and	oppose	this	method	of	
interpretation	believe	that	China’s	augmented	role	in	Africa	is	predominantly	driven	
by	 economic	motives	 to	 sustain	 the	 high	 levels	 of	 growth	 China	 has	 experienced	
throughout	 the	 past	 three	 decades.	 A	 point	 of	 contention	 within	 this	 school	 of	
thought	 occurs	 in	 evaluating	 the	 consequences	 of	 Chinese	 economic	 actions	 in	
Africa.	 On	 one	 side	 of	 the	 debate,	 there	 are	 researchers	 who	 interpret	 these	
economic	 transactions	 as	 undermining	 development	 and	 primarily	 benefiting	
corrupt	elites	 in	various	African	states,	ultimately	making	weak	African	economies	
increasingly	dependent	on	China.	This	argument	leads	many	researchers	to	conclude	
that	 China	 is	 a	 rising	 neocolonial	 power	 in	 Africa.	 Contrarily,	 others	 view	 China’s	
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economic	actions	as	mutually	beneficial	to	both	China	and	its	African	counterparts,	








characterize	 all	 Sino-African	 engagements	 within	 the	 context	 of	 imperialism	
whereas	another	scholar	holds	that	all	Sino-African	engagements	are	part	of	a	grand	
scheme	 to	 undermine	 the	West.	 A	 number	 of	 flaws	 emerge	 once	 these	 schools	 of	
interpretation	 are	 considered	mutually	 exclusive.	 In	 reality,	 Sino-African	 relations	
are	diverse	and	have	different	effects	on	different	African	states.	Moreover,	many	of	
the	 claims	 concerning	 Chinese	 actions	 in	 Africa	 are	 seemingly	 based	 on	 the	
preconceived	 notions	 that	 one	 has	 concerning	 China.	 For	 instance,	 due	 to	 the	
diversity	 of	 Sino-African	 engagements,	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 one	 to	 find	 evidence	 to	
support	any	of	the	previously	mentioned	schools	of	thought.		
This	section	identifies	a	number	of	reasons	for	a	lack	of	accord	in	the	existing	
literature	 on	 Sino-African	 relations.	 First,	 this	 area	 of	 research	 only	 emerged	 in	 a	
significant	way	in	the	early	2000s	when	China	‘reengaged’	with	Africa.	Prior	to	the	
dawn	of	the	21st	century,	Sino-African	relations	did	exist	but	on	a	much	more	limited	
scale,	 especially	 compared	 to	 American-African	 relations	 or	 the	 vast	 post-colonial	
	 10	
literature	on	European-African	relations.		Additionally,	there	has	been	a	tendency	to	
make	 grand	 conclusions	 that	 attempt	 to	 define	 and	 encompass	 all	 Sino-African	




provinces	 have	 a	 degree	 of	 autonomy	 in	 conducting	 foreign	 relations	 with	 other	
sovereign	 states.9	Therefore,	 creating	 broad,	 overarching	 frameworks	 that	 seek	 to	
encompass	all	Chinese	engagements	in	Africa	can	be	misleading.			
By	 contrast,	 this	 thesis	 considers	 ‘non-interference’	 as	 a	more	 appropriate	
overarching	 concept,	 but	 the	 difference	 is	 that	 non-interference	 is	 an	 explicit,	
formal,	 often	 utilized	 and	 guiding	 foreign	 policy	 principle	 for	 China.	 Thus,	 there	
should	be	a	more	apparent	empirical	footprint	that	can	be	evaluated.	Furthermore,	
in	 my	 review	 of	 the	 literature,	 it	 appears	 that	 many	 researchers	 seemingly	 have	
predetermined	 assumptions	 about	 China,	 which	 can	 lead	 to	 incorrect	
interpretations	 of	 data	 and	 other	 relevant	 information	 -	 points	 that	 I	will	 expand	
upon	 later	 in	 this	 chapter.	 	 Again,	 by	 highlighting	 ‘non-interference,’	 this	 thesis	
points	to	important	evidence	that	runs	counter	to	some	built	in	assumptions	about	
Sino-African	 relations,	 including	 the	 idea	 that	 China	 possesses	 an	 active,	 even	
aggressive,	grand	strategy,	and	that	African	countries	are	relatively	passive	actors,	
even	victims,	of	Chinese	dominance.	Finally,	the	secretive	nature	of	the	Communist	




know	 the	 true	 nature	 of	 Sino-African	 relations	 and	 the	 consequences	 of	 these	
interactions.	 	 For	 these	 reasons,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 conduct	 more	 systematic	






The	Chinese	 Imperialism	argument	 is	by	 far	 the	weakest	of	 the	 three,	since	
supporters	generally	fail	to	offer	a	clear	definition	of	imperialism.	Most	subscribers	
to	 the	belief	 that	China	 is	an	 imperial	power	 in	Africa	derive	 from	Western	media	
outlets	 and	 various	 Western	 governments,	 which	 use	 stern	 rhetoric	 against	 the	
Chinese	 but,	 in	 actuality,	 do	 little	 to	 address	 the	 ‘imperial	 threat’	 of	 China.	 Other	
researchers	 who	 argue	 that	 China	 is	 an	 imperial	 power,	 such	 as	 Tiffen10	and	
Okeowo,11	fail	to	define	imperialism	and	intertwine	a	potential	definition	with	their	
analysis.	Thus,	one	consistent	problem	that	has	emerged	pertaining	to	this	school	of	
Sino-African	 understanding	 is	 that	 researchers	 often	 fail	 to	 clearly	 define	 their	












concept	 of	 imperialism	 is	 found	 within	 the	 work	 of	 Foster.12	Foster	 effectively	
argues	 that	 imperialism	 is	 dynamic	 and	modern	 imperialism	will	 look	 drastically	
different	form	“traditional”	forms	of	imperialism.	However,	Foster	does	not	further	
define	the	specific	 features	of	her	 interpretation	of	 imperialism.13	Perhaps	because	
of	 their	 lack	 of	 analytical	 clarity,	 other	 researchers	 reject	 the	 interpretation	 that	
China	 is	 an	 imperial	 power.	 Namely,	 Junbo	 and	 Frasheri,14	Alden,15	and	 Power	 et	
al.,16	have	argued	that	China	 is	certainly	not	an	 imperial	power	based	the	 fact	 that	
China	has	no	known	unilateral	fighting	force	on	African	soil.		
Moreover,	in	attempting	to	draw	connections	between	Sino-African	relations	




domination	 and	 control	 of	 the	 periphery	 by	 a	 more	 powerful	 state.17	He	 further	
characterizes	 the	 possibility	 of	 an	 ‘informal	 empire,’	 in	 which	 the	 most	 powerful	
state	 exerts	 ‘decisive	 influence’	 within	 a	 lesser-developed	 country.	 Informal	










these	 ideals	 could	 be	 evaluated	 by	 scholars	 to	 better	 define	 imperialism	 and	
determine	 whether	 China	 is	 an	 imperial	 power	 in	 Africa.	 Perhaps	 it	 would	 be	















Western	 hegemony	 more	 generally	 or	 (2)	 the	 West	 wants	 to	 undermine	 China’s	







The	 latter	 argument	 relies	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 China	 is	 simply	 responding	 to	
Western	accusations,	attempting	to	project	an	 image	as	a	benevolent	 leader	of	 the	
developing	world.	Nonetheless,	 both	perspectives	 rely	on	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	
object	 of	 China’s	 power	 is	 the	West,	 not	 domination	 over	African	 states,	 as	 in	 the	
imperialism	understanding.		
	 It	 is	 imperative	 to	 keep	 in	mind	 that	many	 political,	 military,	 and	 cultural	
dimensions	 of	 China’s	 interactions	with	 Africa	 have	 been	 interpreted	 through	 the	
lens	 of	 Great	 Power	 Rivalry,	 upon	 which	 I	 will	 further	 elaborate,	 but	 they	 could	
equally	 be	 considered	 Chinese	 Imperialism	 also.	 Certainly	 a	 lack	 of	 clarity	 in	
defining	and	applying	imperialist	arguments	to	Sino-African	relations	has	muddied	




	 Scholars	who	contend	 that	China	 is	 executing	a	 calculated	policy	agenda	 to	
undermine	 Western	 hegemony	 primarily	 include	 Rinehart	 and	 Gitter 20 	and	
O’Rourke.21	According	to	these	researchers,	China	does	want	to	expand	its	influence	
at	the	expense	of	Western	powers	around	the	world.	O’Rouke	draws	upon	Chinese	
efforts	 to	 stabilize	 anti-Western	 states,	 such	 as	 Zimbabwe,	 Libya,	 and	 the	 Sudan,	
through	 enormous	 aid,	 both	monetary	 and	 in	 the	 form	of	military	 arms.	22	In	 fact,	








illustrate	 that	 China	 wants	 to	 thwart	 Western	 hegemony	 in	 the	 international	
arena.24	Others	argue	that	China’s	diplomatic	intervention	during	civil	unrest	within	
Sudan,	without	initially	including	Western	powers,	also	illustrates	China’s	desire	to	








them	 to	 evacuate	 Chinese	 citizens	 from	 conflict	 zones.27	Rinehart	 and	 Gitter	 also	














	 A	 number	 of	 researchers,	 conversely,	 have	 concluded	 that	 China	 is	 not	
executing	a	plan	to	purposely	undermine	great	powers,	despite	the	fact	that	China’s	
rise	 inevitably	 impacts	 power	 relations	 in	 the	 international	 arena.	 Shinn	 depicts	
China’s	 engagement	 with	 Africa	 in	 a	 perspective	 of	 US	 unipolarity	 and	 Western	
dominance	 in	 multilateral	 forums.29	He	 holds	 that	 Sino-African	 relations,	 despite	
being	motivated	by	pragmatic	political	or	economic	 reasons,	 inherently	 impact	US	
hegemony.	For	instance,	Shinn	and	Eisenman30	and	Puska31	emphasize	China’s	“One	
China”	policy,	 in	which	China	only	 invests	 in	states	that	officially	recognize	Beijing	
and	not	Taipei.	This	policy	has	resulted	in	the	growth	of	Chinese	‘yuan	diplomacy,’	in	
which	 China	 gives	 out	 loans	 and	 aid	 projects	 to	 its	 political	 allies	 who	 do	 not	
recognize	Taiwanese	sovereignty.		
Two	 aspects	 of	 the	 One	 China	 policy	 are	 important	 in	 understanding	 the	
impact	of	Sino-African	relations	in	a	Great	Power	Rivalry	perspective.	First,	Chinese	
“aid	 for	 trade”	 projects	 in	 Africa,	 low	 interest	 loans,	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 conditions	 on	
monetary	 aid	 for	 political	 allies	 predictably	 influences	 African	 elites	 to	 continue	
having	 positive	 relations	with	 China,	 as	 argued	by	Thrall32	and	 Shambaugh,33	who	
believe	 that	 Beijing	 uses	 monetary	 incentives,	 such	 as	 low	 interest	 loans,	 to	
undermine	 the	 ability	 of	 Western	 powers	 to	 influence	 the	 domestic	 policies	 of	











Second,	China’s	desire	 to	court	African	 leaders	has	 led	 to	China	creating	 its	
own	forums	and	relationships	with	multilateral	organizations,	of	which	China	is	not	
a	member.	 For	 instance,	 Shinn	 and	 Eisenman35	examine	 how	 China’s	 relationship	
with	 the	African	Union	(AU),	which	China	built	a	$200	million	headquarters	 for	 in	
Addis	Ababa,	and	the	creation	of	 the	Forum	on	China-Africa	Cooperation	(FOCAC),	
China’s	 primary	method	 of	 conducting	 affairs	with	African	 leaders,	 has	 fostered	 a	
great	deal	of	African	support	for	China.	An	example	of	China’s	augmented	prestige	in	
the	AU	is	 the	election	of	African	Union	Commission	Chairperson,	 Jean	Ping,	who	is	
half	 Chinese.36	The	 United	 States	 and	 other	 Western	 powers	 are	 excluded	 from	
many	 of	 these	 multilateral	 forums,	 such	 as	 FOCAC. 37 	Essentially,	 since	 China	
reinvigorated	 its	 relations	with	African	states,	 its	desire	 to	 find	political	allies	and	
peacefully	 engage	 with	 the	 continent	 does	 have	 clear	 implications	 for	 Western	
hegemons.		
Moreover,	Enuka38	and	Nesbitt39	argue	that	Beijing’s	arms	deals	with	violent	
pariah	 regimes	 and	 the	 construction	 of	 Chinese-funded,	 light	 arms	 weapons	
factories	 for	African	 leaders,	which	often	circumvents	Western-imposed	sanctions,	
have	been	cited	as	fueling	a	Great	Power	Rivalry,	in	which	African	militaries	rely	on	










forces	 as	 well	 as	 militant	 rebel	 groups	 in	 the	 Sudan’s	 western	 and	 southern	
provinces,	 attempting	 to	 illustrate	 that	 China	 is	 actively	 seeking	 ways	 in	 which	
African	militaries	can	become	proxies	for	Beijing.		
	 Other	researchers	argue	that	China’s	recent	relations	with	African	states	are	
based	 on	 China’s	 desire	 to	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 benevolent	 leader	 and	 responsible	
stakeholder	 for	 the	 developing	 world.	 Taylor,43	Thrall,44	and	 Shambaugh45	contest	
that	China’s	motivation	to	be	viewed	as	a	cooperative	leader	for	developing	states	is	
a	reaction	of	the	Western	media	portraying	China	as	a	negative	influence	on	African	




Sino-soft	 power	 politics.	 Similar	 to	 Médecines	 Sans	 Frontièrs,	 Chinese	 medical	
teams	 have	 been	 dispatched	 throughout	 the	 continent	 to	 train	 doctors,	 help	
patients,	conduct	research,	and	introduce	traditional	Chinese	treatments	to	African	
doctors.	 Shinn	 and	 Eisenman49	include	 that	 between	 1963	 and	 2005	 more	 than	












power,	 in	 the	 form	 of	medical	 aid	 to	 African	 states,	 has	 allowed	 China	 to	 try	 and	
oppose	Western	claims	that	China	is	an	irresponsible	stakeholder	in	Africa.		
	 He	 Wenping	 mentions	 that	 “Africa	 is	 perhaps	 the	 most	 important	 testing	
ground	for	the	promotion	of	Chinese	soft	power,”	depicting	the	importance	of	Africa	





The	 importance	 of	 soft	 power	 and	 the	media	 in	 projecting	 Chinese	 power	
abroad,	 as	 shared	 by	 these	 authors,	 includes	 the	 fact	 that	 Xinhua,	 China’s	 largest	
state-run	 news	 broadcaster,	 is	 currently	 Africa’s	 largest	 single	 news	 agency.	






towards	 the	 West.	 Instead,	 Chinese	 state	 media	 outlets	 seek	 to	 increase	 China’s	









organizations.56	Soft	 power	 in	 the	 form	 of	media	 is	 important	 to	 the	 Great	 Power	
Rivalry	struggle	due	to	the	influence	wielded	by	the	media.	The	rapid	expansion	of	
Xinhua,	CRI,	and	CCTV	throughout	Africa,	as	well	as	the	generally	positive	reception	
of	 Chinese	 media	 by	 African	 leaders,	 illustrates	 that	 Chinese	 media	 outlets	 are	
competing	against	the	influence	of	Western	media	sources	in	Africa.		
	 Finally,	 Confucius	 Institutes	 (CIs)	 and	 Chinese	 cultural	 exchange	 programs	
with	African	states	are	perhaps	 the	greatest	 representations	of	China’s	soft	power	
and	 its	 impact	on	a	potential	Great	Power	Rivalry,	according	 to	King57	and	Yang.58	
Kurlantzick	 states	 that	 CIs	 are	 ‘reminiscent’	 of	 the	 British	 Council	 and	 Alliance	
Française,	making	their	scope	and	expansion	significant.59	China’s	Office	of	Chinese	
Language	 Council	 International	 (Hanban)	 uses	 CIs	 as	 a	way	 to	 facilitate	 a	 greater	
local	 understanding	 of	 China’s	 culture,	 language,	 and	 increase	 its	 global	 prestige.	




power	 projection	 in	 Africa,	 especially	 through	 CIs,	 is	 being	 perceived	 as	 being	
motivated	 by	 Western	 accusations	 of	 negativity	 towards	 China.	 Therefore,	














A	 third	 argument	 for	 understanding	 Sino-Africa	 relations	 is	 that	 of	 purely	
economic	motivations	and	 their	 consequences	 for	African	 states.	 In	essence,	 these	
authors	 believe	 that	 China	 needs	 resources	 to	 sustain	 high	 economic	 growth	 and	
Africa	has	the	necessary	resources	to	foster	Chinese	development.	One	fundamental	
difference	 exists	 between	 the	 interpretation	 Sino-African	 economic	 engagements.	
The	 first	 holds	 that	 China	 is	 promoting	 sustainable	 development	 for	 Africa,	 thus	
establishing	mutually	 beneficial	 relations.	 The	 second	 division	 suggests	 that	 Sino-
African	 economic	 deals	 favor	 Beijing	 and	 ultimately	 undermine	 African	
development,	 in	which	 China	 is	 accused	 of	 being	 a	neocolonial	 power	 engaged	 in	
unequal	 relationships.	 This	 ideal	 suggests	 that	 African	 states,	 the	 periphery,	 are	
dependent	 upon	 Chinese	 money,	 resources,	 and	 technology	 to	 make	 significant	
gains.64	One	shortcoming	of	Sino-African	economic	research	is	a	lack	of	reliable	data	
due	to	 issues	of	corruption,	 transparency,	and	 illicit	economic	activities	conducted	








partner	since	2009,	and	 the	 long-term	 impacts	of	Chinese	economic	maneuvers	 in	
Africa	are	yet	to	be	fully	seen.		
Enuka 65 	and	 Nesbitt 66 	firmly	 perceive	 China’s	 augmented	 economic	
relationship	with	Africa	as	neocolonial,	resulting	in	negative	developmental	impacts	
to	 African	 states	 for	 a	 number	 of	 reasons.	 Because	 Chinese	 aid	 comes	 with	 no	
conditions,	it	often	ends	up	in	the	hands	of	corrupt	officials	who	use	the	money	for	
their	own	use	or	use	foreign	aid	to	undermine	 legitimate	opposition	groups.	Many	
African	 leaders,	 therefore,	 are	 reliant	 upon	 Chinese	 funds	 to	 stay	 in	 power	 and	
increase	 their	own	personal	wealth	–	a	dependency	 that	China	 can	use	 to	 its	own	
advantage.	 Moreover,	 many	 believe	 that	 medium	 and	 small	 Chinese,	 privately	
owned	businesses	 are	 taking	 jobs	 away	 from	 indigenous	Africans	 despite	 the	 fact	
that	many	 African	 consumers	 are	 dependent	 upon	 Chinese	 businesses	 to	 provide	
goods	 to	 the	 market	 at	 a	 cheap	 price.	 Although	 many	 of	 the	 nearly	 one	 million	
Chinese	citizens	living	in	Africa	are	unskilled	and	poorly	educated,	their	connections	




Illicit	 activities	 by	 Chinese	 nationals	 have	 also	 plagued	 China’s	 economic	







are	 just	 a	 few	 of	 the	 many	 grievances	 some	 Africans	 have	 expressed	 regarding	
China’s	 economic	 policy	 on	 the	 continent,	 according	 to	 Hanauer	 and	 Morris,68	
Kurlantzick,69	and	 Thrall.70	Nonetheless,	many	 African	 economies	 dependent	 upon	
the	 Chinese	 extractive	 industry	 and	 these	 labor	 violations	 and	 poor	 conditions	
continue	to	endure.	 	Already,	 four	democratic	countries,	Nigeria,	Ghana,	Togo,	and	
Benin,	 have	 passed	 laws	 restricting	 how	 many	 Chinese	 citizens	 could	 enter	 the	
country	 and	 open	 their	 own	 businesses,	 illustrating	 the	 dissatisfaction	 some	
Africans	are	beginning	to	feel	towards	Chinese	citizens	in	their	country.71	
Mol’s	incorporation	of	the	World’s	System	Theory,	a	theory	first	discussed	by	
Immanuel	Wallerstein72	to	 Sino-African	 relations,	 asserts	 that	 an	 ‘environmentally	
unequal	exchange’	exists	between	ascending	world	powers	and	peripheral	regions.	
For	Mol,	this	indicates	that	China	is	not	a	partner	in	African	development,	but	rather	
an	 expanding	 neocolonial	 power.73	Mol,74	Thrall,75	and	 Shinn	 and	 Eisenman76	have	
















in	 Zambia,	 according	 to	 Hare.77	In	 general,	 these	 scholars	 hold	 that	 an	 inherently	
unequal	economic	reality	exists	in	which	some	countries,	in	this	case	China,	benefit	
at	the	cost	of	nearly	powerless	peripheral	states,	Africa.		
By	 contrast,	 some	 argue	 that	 Chinese	 economic	 engagements	 with	
underdeveloped	 African	 states	 will	 stimulate	mutually	 beneficial	 growth	 for	 both	
China	 and	 its	 economic	 partners	 in	 Africa.	 These	 authors	 cite	 the	 fact	 that	 China	
gives	 more	 aid	 to	 African	 states	 than	 any	 other	 country	 and	 its	 policy	 of	 no	
conditions	 makes	 aid	 more	 readily	 available	 to	 recipients	 than	 loans	 from	 the	
International	 Monetary	 Fund	 (IMF),	World	 Bank,	 and	Western	 industrial	 powers.	
For	instance,	Shinn	and	Eisenman	cite	that	following	Sierra	Leone’s	bloody	civil	war,	
President	 Ellen	 Johnson	 Sirleaf	 stated	 that	 it	 was	 crucial	 for	 the	 international	




package	 should	 constitute.	 King 79 	and	 Ramo 80 	contend	 that	 China’s	 aid	 and	
development	policies	are	 forming	a	Beijing	Consensus,	providing	an	alternative	 to	
the	Western-led,	Washington	Consensus.81	
In	 light	 of	 such	 sparse	 data,	 Strauss	 relies	 on	 ethnographic	 studies	 and	









foundational	 infrastructure	 necessary	 to	 engender	 future	 industrialization. 82	
Strauss,83	as	well	as	Foster	et	al.,84	discuss	Chinese	funded	construction	projects	that	
have	 resulted	 in	 new	 harbors,	 roads,	 electrical	 grids,	water	 treatment	 centers,	 oil	
refineries,	and,	most	well	known,	the	TAMZAM	Railway.		
Still,	 other	 scholars,	 particularly	 Alden85	and	 Park,86	recognize	 that	 it	 is	
difficult	 to	 categorize	 all	 Chinese	 economic	 investments	 in	 Africa	 as	 either	
contributing	 to	 economic	 growth	 or	 taking	 advantage	 of	 an	 already	weak	 African	
economic	 structure.	 Park’s	 ethnographic	 research	 in	 Lesotho	 and	 South	 Africa	
contends	 that	 South	 Africans	 generally	 believe	 that	 Chinese	 investors	 and	 small	








development	 in	 the	 region.	Alden	 recognizes	 the	 influx	of	Chinese	 investment	and	
the	 potential	 for	 it	 to	 help	 other	 African	 states	 maintain	 growth	 rates	 similar	 to	










significantly	 diversifying	 African	 economies	 and	 much	 of	 the	 aid	 China	 gives	 to	
Africa	ends	up	in	the	hands	of	pariah	regimes.89		
Mommsen’s	 concept	 of	 developmental	 neocolonialism	 holds	 that	
disproportionate	economic	relations	and	developmental	aid	to	weaker	states	results	
in	 those	 states	 becoming	 so	 reliant	 upon	 the	 donor	 state	 that	 a	 neocolonial	
dependency	 emerges.	 This	 developmental	 neocolonial	 interpretation	 further	
contends	 that	 the	 center,	 in	 this	 case	 China,	 extracts	 natural	 resources	 from	 a	
dependent	 states	while	 simultaneously	 exporting	 goods	 and	 capital	 to	 the	 lesser-
developed	 state	 on	 unfavorable	 terms	 for	 that	 client	 state.90	In	 a	 context	 of	 Sino-
African	relations,	one	could	consider	Chinese	development	aid,	resource	extraction	





	 Sino-African	 relations	 are	 clearly	 complex	 and,	 despite	 the	 existing	
















































surprising	 lack	 of	 communication	 amongst	 these	 schools	 of	 thought.	 This	 lack	 of	
communication	has	resulted	in	researchers	attempting	to	categorize	all	Sino-African	
engagements	 into	 one	 school	 of	 thought,	 largely	 ignoring	 the	 diverse	 nature	 of	
Chinese	foreign	policy.	 	One	important	goal	of	this	thesis	is	to	take	China’s	declared	




undercut	 many	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 theories,	 including	 neo-imperialism,	 Great	
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Power	 Rivalry,	 and	 possibly	 even	 neocolonialism.	 This	 is	 true	 because	 the	 three	
schools	 of	 thought	 regarding	 Sino-African	 affairs	 assume	 that	 Beijing	 has	 a	 grand	
strategy	 to	 intervene	 in	 Africa	 to	 build	 an	 empire,	 compete	 against	 the	West,	 or	
make	African	economies	and	leaders	dependent	upon	Chinese	policies,	knowledge,	
aid,	 and	 technology	 to	 expand.	 Thus,	 if	 Beijing	 closely	 adheres	 to	 its	 non-
interference	 policy,	 which	 is	 generally	 based	 on	 peaceful	 coexistence,	 mutually	
beneficial	 relations,	 and	 not	 meddling	 in	 another	 state’s	 domestic	 policies,	 these	
elements	 of	 non-interference	 run	 counter	 to	 arguments	 that	 China	 is	 an	 imperial	
power,	 using	 Africa	 as	 a	 proxy	 to	 wage	 a	 Great	 Power	 Rivalry,	 or	 a	 neocolonial	
presence	 in	 African.	 All	 three	 of	 these	 schools	 of	 thought	 suggest	 some	 sort	 of	
interference	in	African	politics	for	Beijing	to	succeed.		
However,	 I	argue	that	using	China’s	policy	of	non-interference	as	a	mode	of	












Nu	 agreed	upon	5	Principles	of	Peaceful	Coexistence	 (5	Principles).	 The	5	Principles	
are:	 (1)	 mutual	 respect	 for	 each	 other’s	 territorial	 integrity	 and	 sovereignty,	 (2)	





	 This	 chapter	 will	 evaluate	 five	 key	 elements	 that	 often	 are	 used	 to	 define	
Sino-African	 relations:	 pariah	 regimes,	 Beijing’s	 “One	 China”	 policy,	 Chinese	
involvement	 in	 multilateral	 forums,	 aid	 non-conditionality	 as	 well	 as	 trade	
imbalances,	 and	 Beijing’s	 soft	 power	 projection.	 These	 five	 dimensions	 of	 Sino-
African	 relations	 are	 perhaps	 the	most	 contentious	 and	 widely	 used	 by	 theorists	
adhering	 to	 all	 three	 schools,	 and	 their	 sub-categories,	 of	 understanding	 Sino-
African	relations.	By	analyzing	these	topics	through	China’s	non-interference	policy,	
this	 chapter	 illustrates	 Beijing’s	 justifications	 for	 its	 diverse	 foreign	 policy	 acts	 in	
Africa,	which	the	CPC	considers	to	be	in	accordance	with	the	5	Principles.	Ultimately,	
this	Chapter	will	show	that	researchers	should	take	China’s	non-interference	policy	
seriously	 as	 a	way	 to	 better	 understand	 Sino-African	 engagements	 than	 the	 three	
predominant	 schools	of	 thought.	Additionally,	 this	 chapter	 illustrates	how	authors	
adhering	to	multiple	modes	of	interpretation	often	use	these	various	dimensions	of	
Sino-African	 relations	 to	 uphold	 their	 argument,	 indicating	 that	 it	 is	 exceedingly	
difficult	to	characterize	these	elements	into	one	single	mode	of	interpretation.	
																																																								
91 Neuhauser, 1968, p. 3-4 
	 31	
	 Before	 beginning,	 however,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 point	 out	 that	 ‘non-
interference’	 does	 not	 mean	 ‘non-engagement.’	 The	 latter	 is	 an	 isolationist	 idea,	
which	 clearly	 is	 not	 China’s	 intent	 in	 Sino-African	 relations.	 Rather,	 ‘non-
interference’	has	more	to	do	with	respecting	and	protecting	the	sovereign	integrity	






	 China’s	 relationship	with	 authoritarian,	 pariah	 regimes	has	 been	 a	 point	 of	
contention	 when	 determining	 how	 to	 interpret	 Sino-African	 relations.	 Zimbabwe,	
Qaddafi’s	Libya,	Sudan,	Angola,	and	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	(DRC)	are	key	
economic	 and	political	 allies	 for	Beijing	 in	Africa.	 China	has	upheld	 these	 regimes	
with	 monetary	 aid	 gifts,	 arms	 deals,	 circumventing	 Western-imposed	 sanctions	
regimes	 through	 trade	 agreements,	 and	 even	 constructing	weapon-manufacturing	
factories	for	the	Sudanese	and	Angolan	government	at	Chinese	expense.92	However	
China	seemingly	views	its	relationship	with	African	states	as	being	consistent	with	
its	 non-interference	 policy.93	In	 other	 words,	 China	 claims	 that	 it	 seeks	 to	 not	
interfere	 with	 the	 domestic	 politics	 of	 another	 country	 and,	 as	 a	 result,	 remains	
neutral,	apolitical,	and	largely	engages	with	other	states	in	purely	economic	terms.	
Chinese	 arms	 deals	 with	 pariah	 regimes	 and	 circumventing	 Western	 imposed	
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	 Nonetheless,	 Rinehart	 and	 Gitter96 	and	 O’Rourke97	believe	 that	 China	 is	
intentionally	 executing	 a	 systematic	 agenda	 to	 undermine	 Western	 expansion	
(Great	 Power	 Rivalry)	 and	 restructure	 the	 current	world	 order	 so	 that	 China	 can	




states	 to	 its	 side	 as	 possible	 to	 undermine	 Western	 influence	 in	 international	
forums,	such	as	 the	UN.	Moreover,	 the	 isolation	that	many	of	 these	states	 face	has	
made	 them	arguably	 reliant	on	Chinese	monetary	 funds	and	arms	deals	 to	 stay	 in	
power	(neocolonial).98	




94 Adem, 2010, p. 12	
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despite	 largely	 not	 knowing	 how	 Chinese	 aid	 is	 used,	 Beijing	 is	 providing	 these	
states	with	 aid	 projects.99	Moreover,	 those	who	believe	 that	 Chinese	 engagements	
with	 African	 states	 are	 generally	 positive	 suggest	 that	 China’s	 close	 relationship	
with	 many	 pariah	 regimes	 has	 helped	 resolve	 conflicts	 such	 as	 the	 Sudan-South	
Sudan	crisis.	As	Sudan	and	South	Sudan	 fought	over	natural	resources	 in	disputed	
territories,	 Chinese	 officials	 helped	 the	 two	 sides	 reach	 an	 agreement	 and	 even	










recognize	 the	People’s	Republic	 of	 China	 (PRC)	 over	 the	Republic	 of	 China	 (ROC),	
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with	China’s	domestic	 affairs.	The	 consequences	of	 this	policy	have	been	 received	
differently	 by	 many	 scholars	 and	 illustrate	 the	 inability	 to	 define	 even	 just	 this	
aspect	of	Chinese	foreign	policy	within	one	school	of	interpretation.	In	fact,	Beijing’s	
One	 China	 policy	 is	 often	 used	 by	 researchers	 within	 all	 three	 schools	 of	
understanding	 Chinese	 actions	 in	 Africa,	 depicting	 the	 complexity	 of	 Sino-African	
relations.		
Much	of	the	PRC’s	and	ROC’s	efforts	to	win	political	support	and	recognition	
from	 other	 states	 has	 taken	 the	 form	 of	 ‘dollar	 diplomacy,’	 in	which	 aid	 projects,	




Conversely,	 African	 states	 that	 are	 heavily	 dependent	 upon	 Chinese	
investments	and	its	 ‘yuan	diplomacy’	practices,	such	as	South	Africa,	are	politically	
restricted	 from	 changing	 their	 official	 recognition	 (neocolonialism).	 For	 instance,	
following	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 apartheid	 regime	 in	 South	 Africa,	 the	 new	 government	
desired	 to	 recognize	 both	 Beijing	 and	 Taiwan,	 a	 clear	 violation	 of	 the	 CPC’s	 One	
China	policy.	As	a	result,	China	threatened	to	withdraw	its	investments	in	the	South	
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African	 economy,	 cut	 its	 aid	 and	 low	 interest	 loans	 to	 the	 country,	 and	 sever	
diplomatic	 ties	 between	 the	 two	 states.	 Ultimately,	 South	 Africa	 only	 recognized	
Beijing	in	the	fear	that	China	pulling	its	investments	would	shatter	its	economy	and	
cripple	its	development	efforts.103	This	instance	has	been	interpreted	by	adherents	
of	 the	 neocolonial	 argument	 grounded	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 South	 Africa	 was	 so	
dependent	on	Beijing’s	economic	 involvement	 in	 the	country	 that	 it	was	unable	 to	
make	 policy	 decisions	 for	 itself	 without	 facing	 imminent	 economic	 turmoil.	 In	
essence,	China	exerted	political	control	over	the	South	African	government	in	terms	
of	 the	Beijing-Taipei	 issue	due	 to	South	Africa’s	dependency	on	Chinese	economic	
engagements.	There	is	concern	that	China	could	threaten	similar	consequences	for	
states	that	disagree	with	current	and	future	territorial	claims	made	by	the	Chinese.	








the	UN	 in	1971,	 especially	 fuels	what	 some	 consider	 to	be	 a	Great	Power	Rivalry.	
The	 US	 voted	 against	 Beijing	 replacing	 Taiwan	 in	 the	 UN,	 taking	 the	 particularly	
important	UN	Security	Council	P-5	seat,	illustrating	that	the	US	lost	a	key	ally	in	the	
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the	 current	 methods	 of	 interpreting	 Sino-African	 relations	 are	 not	 mutually	
exclusive.	 The	 establishment	 of	multilateral	 institutions,	 FOCAC,	 provides	 the	 CPC	




uneven	 bilateral	 discussions,	 which	 would	 undermine	 China’s	 policy	 of	 mutual	
benefits	and	equality.	However,	multilateral	forums	provide	the	CPC	with	a	sense	of	
legitimacy,	backed	by	its	promise	of	non-interference,	in	state-to-state	relations.	Due	
to	 the	 fact	 that	 a	 great	 number	 of	African	 states	willingly	 send	delegates	 to	 these	
multilateral	 forums,	 it	 is	 more	 difficult	 for	 Sino-critics	 to	 single	 out	 China	 as	
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to	 ‘play	 by	 the	 rules’	 of	 the	 international	 community	 and	 become	 an	 active	
participant	 in	 world	 affairs. 107 	This	 interpretation	 of	 Chinese	 multilateralism,	
therefore,	 is	 used	 by	 some	 to	 contend	 that	 China	 is,	 by	 no	 means,	 seeking	 to	
undermine	Western	hegemony	given	the	fact	that	the	CPC	has	joined	international	
institutions	 that	 require	 it	 to	 abide	 by	 a	 particular	 set	 of	 regulations.	 Conversely,	
others	point	to	how	the	CPC	has	acted,	once	a	member	of	multilateral	 forums,	and	
argue	that	there	is	a	Great	Power	Rivalry	at	play.	The	clearest	example	of	this	can	be	
seen	 in	 how	 China	 has	 acted	 in	 the	 Human	 Rights	 Council	 (HRC).	 China	 has	
incorporated	 its	 multilateral	 policy	 and	 non-interference	 to	 shield	 itself	 from	
criticism	concerning	human	rights	violations	and	political	freedom.	The	CPC	adheres	
to	 a	 belief	 that	 each	 state	 has	 a	 different	 understanding	 of	 human	 rights	 and	
governing.	 It	 is	 a	 violation	 of	 that	 state’s	 domestic	 policy	 and	 a	 breach	 of	 non-
interference	 policy,	 therefore,	 to	 punish	 a	 state	 for	 governing	 a	 certain	 way	 or	
interpreting	human	rights	differently	than	another	state.	In	essence,	China	promotes	
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as	part	of	a	country’s	domestic	policy	has	protected	Beijing	from	similar	criticisms	
and	 repercussions.	 Since	 the	 1989	 Tiananmen	 Square	 protests,	 China	 has	 rallied	
developing,	 through	 the	 pretense	 of	 non-interference,	 to	 try	 and	 deter	 Western	
criticisms.109	For	this	reason,	China	has	largely	been	protected	in	the	HRC	and	other	
multilateral	forums	responsible	for	human	rights	oversight	and	political	freedom.		




principle	 of	 non-interference	 and	 not	 impeding	 upon	 another	 nation’s	 domestic	
affairs.	However,	since	the	growth	of	China’s	multilateral	foreign	policy	agenda,	the	
CPC	now	uses	non-interference	to	justify	its	involvement	in	UN	PKOs.	UN	PKOs	are	
justified	through	non-interference	policy	as	 long	as	a	state	 invites	 the	PKO	into	 its	
borders.	As	a	result,	China,	for	the	first	time	in	its	history,	volunteered	PLA	troops	to	
the	 UN	 PKO	 in	 Sudan	 (UNAMID)	 and	 in	 the	 2011	 and	 2013,	 Beijing	 sent	 its	 first	
combative	 troops	 to	 help	 in	 the	 South	 Sudan	 (UNMISS)	 and	 Mali	 (MINUSMA)	
respectively.110	
This	policy	change	has	alerted	some	to	interpret	China’s	involvement	in	PKOs	
with	 skepticism.	Mali,	 Sudan,	 and	 South	 Sudan,	 are	 all	 states	with	 close	 economic	
ties	 to	Beijing,	have	 important	raw	materials	 that	are	exported	 to	China,	and	have	
large	 Chinese-funded	 infrastructure	 projects.	 Thus,	 these	 relationships	 could	 be	
interpreted	 as	 China	 creeping	 towards	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	 empire	 (Chinese	
																																																								




the	 pretext	 of	 non-interference	 and	 multilateralism.	 Others	 argue	 that	 there	 is	 a	
Great	Power	Rivalry	at	play	due	to	the	fact	that	China,	rather	than	Western	states,	is	
increasingly	 represented	 in	 these	 operations	 and	 able	 to	 better	 coordinate	 efforts	







from	 a	 single	 policy	 decision,	 such	 as	 China	 sending	 combative	 forces	 to	 Mali,	
elucidates	the	complexity	of	Sino-African	engagements	and	the	inability	to	precisely	
make	 all	 Sino-African	 engagements	 fit	 within	 the	 confines	 of	 one	 school	 of	





of	 non-interference	 policy.	 As	 a	 rising	 power,	 China	 seeks	 to	 spread	 its	 influence	
where	 necessary	 but	 must	 also	 carefully	 act	 within	 the	 guidelines	 of	 non-
interference.	Consequently,	soft	power	has	provided	Beijing	with	a	means	to	exert	
																																																								
111 Power et al., 2012, p. 94 
112 Stauss, 2013, p. 163 
	 40	
its	 influence	 while	 still	 adhering	 to	 the	 5	 Principles.	 Soft	 power	 expansion	 has	
primarily	 occurred	 in	 Chinese-funded	 media	 projects,	 Confucius	 Institutes,	 and	
cultural	 exchange	 programs	 between	 China	 and	 its	 African	 counterparts.	 Because	
African	 states	 allow	 China	 to	 exert	 this	 form	 of	 non-military	 power,	 Beijing	 can	
legitimize	 its	actions	as	respecting	 the	sovereignty	of	a	state	while	simultaneously	
promoting	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 Chinese	 ideals	 and	 cultural	 norms	 (non-
interference	policy).	





as	Kurlantzick,	 to	 the	 ideology	 that	China	 is	 involved	 in	 a	Great	Power	Rivalry,	 as	
well	as	many	of	 those	who	believe	China	 is	an	emerging	 imperial	power	 in	Africa,	
argue	 that	 Chinese	 soft	 power	 is	 a	 way	 to	 counter	 the	 West.113	Western	 media	
outlets	 in	 Africa	 have	 been	 critical	 of	 Chinese	 engagements	 with	 African	 states,	
especially	 authoritarian	 regimes	 with	 questionable	 human	 rights	 records.	 These	
scholars	believe	that	China,	now	the	continent’s	largest	media	investor	particularly	
through	the	state-run	media	outlet,	Xinhua,	is	a	way	to	push	Western	ideology	out	of	
the	 continent	and	 replace	 it	with	CPC	propoganda.	For	 instance,	Xinhua	will	 often	
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work	 alongside	 its	 African	 counterparts	 and	 publish	 rhetorical	 articles	 in	 support	
how	Beijing	interprets	the	status	of	Tibet,	Taiwan,	and	the	South	China	Sea.114		
	 Conversely,	 many	 believe	 that	 China	 is	 benignly	 expanding	 its	 media	
presence	around	the	world	and	countering	false	Western	accusations	of	imperialism	
and	 neocolonialism.	 A	 number	 of	 independent	 media	 outlets	 and	 NGOs	 have	
applauded	 Xinhua	 for	 providing	 media	 service	 infrastructure,	 many	 of	 which	 are	
free,	 to	 Africans	 who	 would	 not	 have	 access	 to	 such	 information	 otherwise.	
Moreover,	 Xinhua	 is	 sometimes	 perceived	 as	 being	 more	 reliable	 and	 providing	
more	 transparent	 information	 than	 the	 states	within	which	 it	 operates,	 especially	
hyper-corrupt	states.	115		
On	the	other	hand,	researchers	who	believe	that	Chinese	soft	power	in	Africa	




sums	 of	 money	 to	 African	 universities	 that	 allow	 CIs	 to	 function	 and	 prosper.	
Furthermore,	China	uses	FOCAC	to	have	cultural	exchange	programs	with	a	majority	
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	 China’s	 foreign	 aid	 policy	 states	 that	 there	 must	 not	 be	 conditions	 on	 aid	
given	to	recipient	states.	In	essence,	the	CPC	does	not	attach	conditions	to	the	aid	it	




are	 meant	 to	 pressure	 and	 change	 the	 way	 a	 government	 governs,	 a	 principle	
directly	 against	 non-interference	 policy.	 Thus,	 China	 is	 simply	 allowing	 recipient	
governments	to	have	the	sovereignty	to	use	the	monetary	aid	as	they	see	fit.	




instability	 or	want	 to	 fund	 development	 projects.	 Moreover,	 Shinn	 and	 Eisenman	
argue	 that	 Chinese-funded	 construction	 projects,	 in	 which	 one	 third	 of	 Chinese-
funded	 construction	 projects	 outside	 of	 China	 are	 now	 based	 in	 Africa,	 engender	
industrialization	 and	 technological	 transfers	 to	 lesser-developed	 states.	 Alden	











asymmetrical,	 in	 favor	 of	 China,	 and	 exploitative.	 These	 authors	 point	 to	 trade	
imbalances	and	large	debt	payments,	as	a	result	of	Chinese	loans,	that	many	African	
states	 experience	when	economically	 engaging	with	Africa	 as	well	 as	 the	 fact	 that	
many	 Chinese	 small	 business	 owners	 in	 Africa	 undermine	 indigenous	markets	 by	
selling	 cheaper	 goods	 imported	 from	 China.	 	 Moreover,	 Chinese	 arms	 sales	 to	
African	 pariah	 regimes	 and	 militia	 groups,	 many	 of	 which	 circumvent	 Western-
imposed	 sanctions	 regimes,	 further	 undermine	 African	 development.	 Finally,	 Mol	





Sino-African	 engagements	 into	 one	 school	 of	 interpretation,	 despite	 attempting	 to	
do	 so	 within	 just	 one	 school	 of	 thought.	 However,	 if	 one	 more	 closely	 considers	
these	 interactions	 in	 a	 context	 of	 China’s	 non-interference	 policy,	 it	 is	 easier	 to	
understand	 that	 regardless	 of	 certain	 engagements	 being	 considered	 mutually	
beneficial	 or	 exploitative,	 there	 is	 a	 underlying	 policy	 of	 non-interference	 which	








	 The	 issue	 of	 aid	without	 conditions	 is	 used	 by	 researchers	who	 argue	 that	
China	is	benignly	developing	Africa,	by	those	contending	that	China	is	exploitative,	
and	by	scholars	holding	that	China	 is	 involved	 in	a	Great	Power	Rivalry.	However,	
the	 diversity	 of	 interpretation	within	 this	 topic	 can	be	 better	 understood	 through	
Beijing’s	 non-interference	 principle.	 Because	 China’s	 non-inference	 policy	
constrains	 it	 from	dictating	how	countries	ought	 to	 spend	 their	aid,	China	has	 the	
ability	to	distance	itself	from	the	consequences	of	the	aid.	In	other	words,	whether	
the	 aid	 has	 positive	 or	 negative	 ramifications,	 China	 holds	 that	 it	 cannot	 tell	 a	
country	in	what	ways	the	aid	must	be	spent.	Therefore,	if	the	aid	is	siphoned	into	the	
hands	 of	 corrupt	 leaders,	 or	 if	 the	 aid	 is	 used	 to	 build	 crucial	 developmental	
infrastructure,	China	can	point	 to	 its	policy	of	non-interference	as	 legitimizing	any	





use	 the	 funds	 to	augment	 its	military	capabilities	while	a	 transparent	government	
may	 choose	 to	 invest	 the	 funds	 in	 education	 or	 expanding	 the	 country’s	 health	
infrastructure.	 Some	 interpret	 Chinese	 aid	 to	 pariah	 regimes	 as	 fueling	 a	 Great	
Power	 Rivalry	 as	 well.	 China	 is	 now	 the	 largest	 single	 aid	 donor	 to	 the	 African	
continent	 and	 some,	 namely	 Ramo,	 believe	 that	 its	 ability	 to	 quickly	 send	 aid	
resources	 to	 developing	 states	 is	 establishing	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	 Washington	
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This	 dependency	model	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 form	 of	 neocolonialism	 in	which	
certain	states	are	so	dependent	on	Chinese	aid	grants	that	they	have	little	political	




	 Moreover,	 by	 incorporating	 China’s	 non-interference	 policy	 to	 Chinese-
favored	 trade	 imbalances,	 which	 are	 used	 by	 adherents	 of	 all	 three	 schools	 of	
interpretation	 as	 evidence	 to	 support	 their	 claims,	 further	 prove	 that	 there	 is	

















economy	 relative	 to	 its	 African	 counterparts,	 and	 any	 technological	 transfer	 is	
beneficial	 despite	 trade	 deficits	 (mutual	 benefits).133	Even	 Great	 Power	 Rivalry	
adherents	 cite	 trade	 imbalances	 as	 making	 African	 states	 align	 with	 China	 over	
Western	 states	 based	 on	 increased	 dependency	 from	 China. 134 	Evidently,	
interpreting	trade	imbalances	through	a	lens	of	non-interference	proves	that	there	
is	 significant	 overlap	 amongst	 all	 three	 schools	 of	 interpretation,	 highlighting	 the	
complex	 and	diverse	nature	of	 Sino-African	 relations	 and	 illustrating	 that	Chinese	





	 Although	 Sino-African	 relations	 have	 been	 largely	 interpreted	 through	 the	
lens	 of	 Chinese	 Imperialism,	 a	 Great	 Power	 Rivalry,	 or	 Economic	 Engagement,	
China’s	 policy	 of	 non-interference	provides	 a	 new,	 and	useful,	mode	of	 explaining	







can	 never	 be	 adjudicated	 by	 words	 alone.	 Actions	 must	 back	 up	 rhetoric.	 The	





























































Principles):	 mutual	 respect	 for	 sovereignty	 and	 territorial	 integrity,	 mutual	 non-
aggression,	 non-interference	 in	 each	 other’s	 affairs,	 equality	 and	mutual	 benefits,	
and	 peaceful	 coexistence.	 Beijing	 asserts	 that	 it	 has	 been	 consistent	 in	 abiding	 by	
	 49	






a	 growing	 concern	 that	 China’s	 non-interference	 policy	 is	 not	 practiced	 in	 reality	
and	 is	 simply	used	as	propaganda	by	Beijing	 to	maneuver	 itself	 into	 a	position	 to	
rival	Western	foes.	Moreover,	as	China	continues	to	bolster	its	relations	with	African	
states,	 many	 scholars	 contend	 that	 Beijing’s	 non-interference	 policy	 will	 be	




in	 the	 United	 Nations	 since	 2000,	 the	 year	 in	 which	 China	 began	 vigorously	
investing	 in	 African	 economies.	 This	 chapter	 outlines	 number	 of	 patterns	 in	 an	








1) China	abstaining	 from	or	voting	against	any	draft	 resolution	 that	would	
attempt	 to	 encourage	 free	 and	 fair,	 democratic	 elections	 in	 a	 Member	
State,	
2) China	 rejecting	 the	 expansion	 of	 any	 UN	 monitoring	 or	 investigatory	
mission	 in	 a	Member	 State	 that	 lacks	 the	 consent	 of	 the	Member	 State	
that	would	be	hosting	the	mission,	
3) China	 abstaining	 from	 or	 voting	 against	 draft	 resolutions	 that	 would	
invoke,	 or	 threatens	 to	 invoke,	Article	41	 of	 the	United	Nations	Charter,	





5) China	 refusing	 to	 support	 any	 UN	 resolution	 that	 would	 force	 it	 to	
decrease	its	weapons	stockpiles,	especially	that	of	nuclear	weapons,	
6) China	abstaining	 from	any	resolution	 that	specifically	refers	 to	disputed	
territories	between	two	states,	




of	 these	 seven	 patterns	 (out	 of	 the	 1,217	 resolutions	 incorporated	 in	 this	 study).	
Moreover,	 Chinese	 voting	 record	 patterns	 definitely	 illustrate	 its	 dedication	 to	 its	
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non-interference	policy.	These	patterns	have	serious	implications	for	Chinese	non-
interference	 policy	 in	 Africa	 as	 Beijing	 and	 its	 African	 counterparts	 grow	
increasingly	closer.	This	chapter	will	first	outline	the	methodology	used	to	evaluate	
Chinese	 non-interference	 policy,	 then	 briefly	 elaborate	 on	 each	 pattern	 from	 the	
findings,	 and	 finally	 investigate	how	 these	patterns	 impact	 each	 school	of	 thought	
concerning	 Sino-African	 relations,	 ultimately	 giving	 greater	 validity	 to	 the	
arguments	 that	 China	 is	 invested	 in	 a	 Great	 power	 Rivalry	 and	 is	 invested	 in	 a	
mutually	beneficial	economic	partnership	with	African	states	while	undermining	the	
claim	that	China	is	an	imperial	power	in	Africa.	Ultimately,	this	chapter	shows	that	





interpretation	 of	 sovereignty,	 in	 which	 China	 believes	 each	 state	 has	 the	 right	 to	
wholly	 and	 legitimately	 determine	 its	 own	 policies	 without	 foreign	 influences	
formulating	 that	 state’s	 policy,	 I	 sought	 to	 find	 a	 method	 to	 determine	 how	
committed	 China	 is	 to	 its	 non-interference	 policy.	 However,	 given	 the	 secretive	
nature	of	Chinese	foreign	policy,	it	was	necessary	to	find	data	that	could	represent	
Chinese	desires.	As	such,	I	began	collecting	and	examining	UN	voting	records	in	the	
Security	Council,	 in	which	China	 is	a	P-5	Member	State	with	veto	powers,	and	 the	
General	Assembly,	in	which	China	is	one	of	193	voting	Member	States.	These	two	UN	




should	 follow.	The	Security	Council	 is	composed	of	 five	permanent	Member	States	
(P-5)	and	ten	temporary	states	that	serve	two-year	terms.	Conversely,	 the	General	
Assembly	is	a	plenary	body	where	every	UN	Member	State	is	present,	all	states	have	
one	 vote,	 and	no	 states	 can	 exercise	 a	 veto.	 The	 concept	 of	 the	UN	 is	 based	upon	
peaceful	development	and	protecting	the	sovereignty	of	Member	States.	Thus,	I	was	








or	 voted	 against	 a	 particular	 resolution	 in	 the	 Security	 Council	 and	 read	 through	
each	 resolution	 or	 draft	 resolution	 to	 find	 patterns.	 The	 same	 technique	 was	
employed	 for	 the	 General	 Assembly	 -	 I	 looked	 through	 each	 General	 Assembly	
resolution	that	was	not	adopted	unanimously,	indicating	that	there	was	at	least	one	
abstention	 or	 one	 vote	 against	 that	 particular	 resolution	 and	 took	 note	 of	 every	









	 China	 has	 decisively	 rejected	 any	 potential	 resolution	 that	 calls	 for	
democratic	 reforms	 as	 well	 as	 free	 and	 fair	 elections	 in	 a	 specific	 country.	 This	
pattern	 is	consistent	with	China’	s	publically	stated	non-interference	policy	due	 to	
the	 fact	 that	 the	 CPC	 is	 refusing	 to	 inject	 itself	 into	 influencing	 the	 political	
governance	 structure	 of	 a	 state.	 Some	 key	 resolution	 topics	 advocating	 for	
democratic	 reforms,	 all	 of	 which	 China	 vetoed	 in	 the	 Security	 Council,	 include:	
calling	 for	 a	 democratic	 political	 transition	 in	 Syria,137	demanding	 that	 the	 Assad	
regime	 allow	 all	 people	 to	 have	 the	 right	 to	 peacefully	 protest	 and	 establish	
democratic	 governance,138	calling	 on	 the	 Syrian	 government	 to	 adopt	 democratic	
reforms	 through	 the	 League	 of	 Arab	 States’	 initiative,139	encouraging	 democratic	
reforms	 in	Zimbabwe,140	and	advocating	 for	democratic	rule	 in	Myanmar.141	In	 the	
General	Assembly,	China	has	similarly	been	reluctant	to	support	any	draft	resolution	
that	 calls	 for	democratic	 change	 in	 a	Member	 State.	 For	 instance,	 China	 abstained	
from	efforts	to	promote	and	consolidate	democracy	around	the	world,142	as	well	as	









democratize,	 such	 as	 promoting	 democracy	 in	 the	 Democratic	 Republic	 of	 the	
Congo143	and	investigating	election	flaws	in	Belarus.144	Interestingly,	although	China	
does	 not	 support	 any	 draft	 resolution	 that	 propagates	 the	 establishment	 or	
consolidation	of	democracy	 in	a	Member	State,	 it	does	vote	 in	 favor	of	resolutions	
that	specifically	reaffirm	the	democratic	nature	of	the	UN	system.145		
	 When	 applied	 to	China’s	 non-interference	policy,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 this	 voting	
pattern	 of	 rejecting	 the	 UN’s	 call	 for	 democratic	 reforms	 in	 a	 specific	 state,	while	
supporting	 general	 democratic	 norms	 in	 the	 UN,	 is	 inherently	 in	 line	 with	 non-
interference.	 Generally,	 having	 a	 multilateral	 organization	 call	 upon	 a	 state	 to	
change	 its	 domestic	 governance	 structure,	 whether	 for	 better	 or	 for	 worse,	 does	




under	 its	 non-interference	 policy	 because	 no	 specific	 state	 is	 being	 coerced	 into	
changing	the	structure	of	its	government.		
	 One	key	aspect	of	this	pattern	in	Chinese	voting	records	is	that	China	is	not	
inherently	 against	 democracy;	 rather,	 the	 PRC	 rejects	 the	 attempts	 by	 the	 UN	 to	
impose	different	forms	of	governance,	whether	democratic	or	nondemocratic,	on	a	
Member	State.	This	distinction	is	most	apparent	in	China’s	support	for	democracy	in	














the	host	country	where	 the	operation	will	 take	place	supports	 the	creation	of	 that	
PKO.	 However,	 China	 has	 rejected	 all	 attempts	 by	 the	 Security	 Council	 to	 expand	
PKOs	and	monitoring	missions	without	the	consent	of	the	host	nation.	For	instance,	
China	 supported	 the	 initial	mandate	 of	 United	Nations	Mission	 in	 the	 Republic	 of	
South	Sudan	(UNMISS)	and	has	voted	 in	 favor	of	continuing	 to	renew	 its	mandate	
each	year.	However,	 attempts	 to	 expand	 the	operation	beyond	 its	 initial	mandate,	
which	 was	 not	 approved	 by	 the	 South	 Sudanese	 government,	 were	 rejected	 by	
Beijing.	 This	 is	 strong	 evidence	 that	 China	 supports	 the	 integrity	 of	 national	
sovereignty	 over	 the	 interventions	 of	 international	 operations.	 It	 is	 important	 to	
note	 that	 the	 Security	 Council	 is	 the	 only	 body	 that	 can	 establish	 PKOs	 and	
monitoring	 missions	 in	 the	 UN.	 In	 voting,	 China	 abstained	 from	 authorizing	 the	








the	 former	 Yugoslavia.	 All	 of	 these	 resolutions	 and	 draft	 resolutions	 would	 have	
expanded	 a	 UN	 PKO	without	 the	 consent	 of	 the	 host	 country,	 illustrating	 China’s	
commitment	to	respecting	a	country’s	national	sovereignty.		
	 Even	more,	 China’s	 refusal	 to	 support	 the	 expansion	 of	 UNMISS	 illustrates	
that	 Beijing	 will	 adhere	 to	 its	 policy	 of	 non-interference	 even	 at	 times	 when	 its	
national	 interests	may	not	be	 furthered	by	 it.	Following	the	kidnapping	of	Chinese	
workers	 from	 South	 Sudanese	 oil	 fields	 in	 2012,	 UNMISS	 has	 been	 crucial	 in	
ensuring	 the	 security	 of	 the	 extractive	 industry	 from	militant	 violence.	 Thus,	 it	 is	
surprising	that	China	would	vote	against	an	expansion	of	this	PKO	given	its	growing	
interests	as	an	economic	stakeholder	in	South	Sudan.	However,	China	respected	the	
South	 Sudanese’s	 desire	 to	 not	 expand	 the	 operation.	 Clearly,	 China’s	 non-
interference	policy	can	even	trump	its	national	interests	abroad.		
	 Although	 China	 rejected	 the	 expansion	 of	 various	 PKOs	 and	 monitoring	
missions,	China	has	supported	the	creation	of	these	same	PKOs.	For	instance,	China	
supported	 the	 creation	 of	 UNMISS, 151 	UNAMID, 152 	and	 UNPREDEP. 153 	This	
distinction	is	 important	because	for	a	PKO	to	be	established,	a	Member	State	must	










certain	state,	China	ensures	 that	 the	state	accepting	 the	operation	 is	 in	agreement	
with	 it	occurring	within	 its	borders.	However,	attempts	 in	 the	UN	to	expand	these	
operations	without	the	consent	of	the	host	state	has	been	a	point	of	contention	for	
China	and	it	has	not	voted	in	favor	of	any	resolution	of	this	nature.	
	 This	 pattern	 of	 only	 voting	 in	 favor	 of	 UN	 missions	 invited	 by	 the	 host	
country	is	in	line	with	Chinese	non-interference	policy.	According	to	Beijing’s	policy,	
expanding	a	mission	without	 the	 consent	of	 the	 state	where	 the	mission	will	 take	
place	 is	a	clear	violation	of	 that	state’s	sovereignty.	 In	other	words,	 if	a	state	does	
not	want	international	monitors	or	peacekeepers	to	work	within	its	borders,	China	
sees	this	as	directly	undermining	that	states	right	to	choose	what	happens	within	its	
territory.	 Conversely,	 if	 a	 state	 openly	 invites	 a	UN	PKO	or	monitoring	mission	 to	
exist	within	its	borders,	China	believes	that	the	establishment	of	a	certain	mission	is	




	 Article	41	of	 the	UN	Charter	mandates	that	 the	Security	Council	can	 impose	
economic	sanctions,	embargoes,	asset	freezes,	and	travel	bans.	In	essence,	it	is	a	tool	
consisting	 of	 economic	 sanctions	 through	which	 the	 international	 community	 can	
punish	states	 that	are	allegedly	undermining	 international	norms.	However,	China	
has	 chosen	not	 to	 vote	 in	 favor	 of	 any	 resolution	 that	would	 invoke	Article	41,	 or	
even	threaten	to	invoke	Article	41,	if	a	country	fails	to	change	its	policies.	Therefore,	
China	 has	 abstained	 from	 a	 number	 of	 Security	 Council	 and	 General	 Assembly	
	 58	
resolutions	 that	 have	 attempted	 to	 invoke,	 through	 the	 Security	 Council,	 or	
threatens	to	invoke	the	use	of	Article	41	against	a	certain	Member	State.	Some	of	the	
topics	of	these	resolutions	include,	but	are	not	limited	to,	invoking	asset	freezes	on	
certain	members	of	 the	Taliban	government	 in	Afghanistan,154	imposing	 economic	
sanctions,	 an	 arms	 embargo,	 targeted	 asset	 freezes,	 and	 travel	 bans	 against	 the	
Sudanese	 government,155	establishing	 individual	 asset	 freezes	 against	 the	 Libyan	
government	 and	 military	 officials, 156 	and	 enacting	 an	 arms	 embargo	 against	
Eritrea.157	
	 China’s	 decision	 to	 reject	 resolutions	 that	 reinforce	 the	 Security	 Council’s	
ability	 to	 enact	 economic	 punishments	 through	 Article	 41	 illustrates	 China’s	




















the	 International	 Criminal	 Court	 (ICC),	 of	 which	 China	 is	 not	 a	 member	 after	
rejecting	the	Rome	Statute.158	China	is	perhaps	particularly	sensitive	about	this	topic	
not	only	due	to	its	allegedly	poor	record	on	human	rights,	but	also	based	on	the	long	




the	 Olympic	 games	 despite	 its	 human	 rights	 record,	 coined	 the	 Olympics	 as	 the	
“blood	games.”159		
Nonetheless,	 when	 considering	 China’s	 voting	 record	 in	 the	 in	 the	 General	
Assembly,	China	has	 abstained	 from	human	 rights-based	 resolutions	 targeting	 the	
Democratic	 Republic	 of	 the	 Congo,160 	Turkmenistan,161 	the	 Islamic	 Republic	 of	
Iran,162	Syria,163	and	 the	 former	 Yugoslavia.164	Moreover,	 China	 has	 consistently	
voted	 against	 General	 Assembly	 resolutions	 exclusively	 targeting	 human	 rights	













Uzbekistan, 168 	and	 Sudan. 169 	In	 the	 Security	 Council,	 Beijing	 abstained	 from	
establishing	human	rights	monitoring	missions	and	subjecting	individuals	to	the	ICC	
in	 Sudan,170	Eritrea,171	and	 Libya172	while	 vetoing	 resolutions	 that	 would	 subject	
Syria,173	Zimbabwe,174	and	Myanmar175	to	human	rights	monitors	and	the	ICC.		
	 It	is	interesting	to	note	that	China’s	voting	record	in	the	UN	on	human	rights	
and	 the	 ICC	 closely	 resembles	 that	 of	Pattern	1:	Democratic	Reforms	and	Free	and	
Fair	Elections.	As	previously	stated,	China	does	not	support	resolutions	that	target	a	
specific	 state	 to	 promote	 democratic	 proliferation.	 However,	 the	 PRC	 supports	
democratic	norms	within	international	 forums.	A	similar	pattern	exists	concerning	
Chinese	 votes	 on	 human	 rights.	 This	 pattern	 suggests	 that	 Beijing	 rejects	 any	
resolution	that	targets	a	specific	country	for	alleged	abuses	while	supporting	broad-
based	human	rights	resolutions	that	do	not	target	particular	Member	States	and	do	
not	 result	 in	 substantive	 action	 being	 taken	 by	 the	UN	 in	 reforming	 the	 domestic	
laws	of	Member	States.	For	instance,	China	voted	in	favor	of	having	representative	

















human	 rights	 resolutions	 that	 do	 not	 attempt	 to	 pressure	 Member	 States	 into	
changing	their	own	domestic	 laws	while	rejecting	resolutions	that	seek	to	monitor	
and	ultimately	change	the	current	status	of	human	rights	in	a	state.		
	 This	 pattern	 very	 strictly	 resembles	 a	 compliance	 with	 Chinese	 non-
interference	policy.	A	major	part	of	China’s	foreign	policy	formulation	is	based	upon	
the	notion	that	each	state	has	a	unique	perception	of	human	rights	and	it	is	unjust	
for	 the	UN	to	try	and	punish	a	state	 for	 its	 ‘abuses.’	China	even	rejects	resolutions	
that	denounce	 the	death	penalty178	and	honor	killings179	because	 a	 resolution	 that	
does	so	could	result	in	the	UN	attempting	to	punish	states	that	have	laws	allowing	
for	the	death	penalty,	like	the	United	States	and	China,	or	honor	killings,	like	Saudi	
Arabia,	 Jordan,	 and	 Syria.	 Therefore,	 China	 clearly	 views	 resolutions	 that	 seek	 to	
punish	a	state	or	change	a	state’s	domestic	policy	as	 interference.	However,	broad	
human	rights	resolutions,	in	which	no	state	is	subject	to	scrutiny	on	its	human	rights	




	 Disarmament,	 especially	 that	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 stockpiles,	 is	 one	 of	 the	
most	 visible	 policy	 issues	 within	 the	 UN	 system.	 In	 fact,	 the	 first	 resolution	 ever	
passed	in	the	General	Assembly,	A/RES/1/1,	established	a	commission	to	deal	with	
the	problems	raised	by	the	discovery	of	atomic	weapons,	illustrating	the	significance	






its	 nuclear	 arsenal.	 For	 example,	 China	 has	 abstained	 from	 any	 resolution	 that	
advocates	 for	 the	 total	 elimination	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 globally, 180 promotes	
“reducing	 nuclear	 danger,”181	which	 includes	 nuclear	 disarmament	 and	 reducing	
state’s	readiness	to	use	nuclear	weapons,	or	enforces	obligations	under	the	Nuclear	




	 In	 terms	 of	 understanding	 Chinese	 non-interference	 policy,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	
China’s	voting	on	disarmament	and	 the	non-proliferation	of	weapons	stockpiles	 is	
captured	 under	 non-interference	 policy.	 From	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 a	 Chinese	
diplomat,	 states	 have	 the	 autonomy	 and	 sovereignty	 to	 build	 up	 their	 military	
arsenals	 within	 their	 own	 borders.	 Thus,	 urging	 Member	 States	 to	 reduce	 or	
eliminate	 their	military	 stockpiles	 is	 an	 intrusion	upon	 the	 sovereign	 right	of	 that	
state	to	pursue	the	policies	it	pleases.	From	nuclear	weapons	to	mines	and	ballistic	
missiles,	China	contends	that	there	is	no	place	for	the	UN	to	intrude	upon	a	Member	













internationally	 disputed	 territories	 since	 2000,	 including	 the	 legal	 status	 of	 these	
territories	 and	 their	 peoples.	 For	 instance	 Beijing	 abstained	 from	 upholding	 the	
territorial	 integrity	 of	 Ukraine,185	determining	 the	 legal	 status	 of	 on	 internally	
displaced	persons	(IDPs)	and	refugees	in	Abkhazia,	Georgia,186	defining	the	status	of	
the	Armenian	occupied	Nagorno-Karabakh	 region	of	Azerbaijan,187	and	 identifying	
the	 territorial	 integrity	 of	 Cyprus,188	which	 is	 occupied	 by	 Turkey	 in	 its	 northern	
regions.	 Although	 these	 resolutions	 are	 diverse	 in	 substance,	 for	 instance	
A/RES/68/262	 focuses	 on	 Ukraine’s	 territorial	 integrity	 while	 A/RES/64/296	
focuses	on	 IDPs	and	 refugees,	China	 continuously	abstains	 from	 involving	 itself	 in	
any	 aspect	 of	 these	 territorial	 disputes.	 Perhaps	 Beijing’s	 rational	 for	 doing	 so	 is	
based	on	the	fact	that	China	struggles	with	its	own	territorial	disputes,	namely	that	
of	 Taiwan,	 Tibet,	 and	 the	 South	 China	 Sea.	 I	 will	 expand	 upon	 this	 idea	 in	 the	
following	section.	China	views	its	own	territorial	disputes	as	an	internal	problem,	in	
which	Beijing	 refers	 to	 Taiwan	 as	 its	 ‘rogue	 province.’	 As	 an	 internal	 issue	 falling	
under	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 a	 sovereign	 Chinese	 state,	 non-interference	 policy	
promotes	 the	 ideal	 that	 it	 is	 not	 up	 to	 another	 state	 or	 the	UN	 to	 get	 involved	 in	








Abstaining	 from,	 rather	 than	 voting	 ‘no’	 on	 these	 sensitive	 resolutions	 is	
important	because	a	negative	vote	could	notion	Chinese	support	for	a	certain	state	
that	 claims	 the	 disputed	 territory.	 For	 example,	 if	 China	 were	 to	 vote	 against	
A/RES/68/262	on	Ukraine’s	territorial	 integrity,	 it	may	be	 interpreted	as	a	sign	of	
support	 to	Russia	 and	 its	 territorial	 aspirations	 in	 eastern	Ukraine.	 Consequently,	





in	which	 the	 Security	 Council	 recommends	 that	 Tuvalu	 be	 admitted	 as	 a	Member	
State	into	the	UN.	In	order	to	explain	this	seemingly	strange	vote,	it	was	necessary	to	
research	 older	 (pre-2000)	 votes	 on	 the	 admission	 of	 new	 states	 into	 the	 UN,	 in	
which	it	became	clear	that	that	China	has	not	supported	the	admission	of	any	state	
that	 recognizes	 the	 ROC	 instead	 of	 the	 PRC.189	This	 portion	 of	 research	 focuses	
Chinese	 voting	 patterns	 concerning	 resolutions	 admitting	 both	 former	 UN	 Trust	
Territories	 and	 aspiring	 UN	 Member	 States	 into	 UN.	 UN	 Trust	 Territories	 were	
territories	 that	 were	 not	 yet	 self-governing	 states	 following	 the	 Third	 Wave	 of	
Democratization	 and	 decolonization.	 Thus,	 the	 UN’s	 Trusteeship	 Council	 worked	
with	neighboring	Member	States	to	build	the	capacity	of	the	Trust	Territories	with	










ROC,	 China’s	 abstention	 from	 S/RES/1290	 is	 much	 clearer.	 Tuvalu	 gained	
independence	 from	 the	 UK	 in	 1978	 and	 subsequently	 recognized	 the	 ROC	 the	
following	year.191	As	part	of	Beijing’s	“One	China”	Policy,	in	which	states	who	desire	
to	have	diplomatic	relations	with	the	PRC	must	only	recognize	China	and	denounce	




therefore,	 an	 interference	 with	 Chinese	 domestic	 policy,	 is	 much	 easier	 to	
comprehend.	China	has	followed	this	same	pattern	in	many	other	votes	on	admitting	
Member	States	into	the	UN.	
















the	 PRC	 to	 the	 ROC.	 In	 these	 cases,	 new	 states	 were	 admitted	 into	 the	 UN	 with	
Chinese	 support	 and	 only	 switched	 their	 recognition	 to	 the	 ROC	 after	 being	
admitted	into	the	UN.	More	so,	as	a	result	of	China’s	One	China	policy,	the	states	that	
recognize	 the	 ROC	 have	 no	 official	 diplomatic	 ties	 with	 China.	 Perhaps	 these	
previously	 aspirating	 UN	 Member	 States	 knew	 that	 Beijing	 would	 reject	 their	
admission	 if	 they	 recognized	 Taiwan,	which	would	 explain	why	 so	many	 of	 these	
states	switched	their	recognition	from	the	PRC	to	the	ROC	after	being	admitted	into	
the	UN.	
	 Papua	 New	 Guinea	 and	Western	 Samoa,	 two	 former	 Trust	 Territories	 that	
were	 administered	by	Australia	 and	New	Zealand	 respectively,	 now	 recognize	 the	
PRC.	 Both	 Papua	 New	 Guinea	 and	 Western	 Samoa,	 because	 they	 were	 directly	
administered	 by	 sovereign	 states,	 already	 had	 de	 facto	 recognition	 of	 the	 PRC	
because	their	administering	states	held	diplomatic	relations	with	the	PRC	beginning	
in	 1972	 (one	 year	 after	 it	 took	 the	 ROC’s	 seat	 in	 the	 UN).197	Thus,	 granting	 both	
Papua	New	Guinea	and	Western	Samoa	UN	membership	in	the	1975	gained	Beijing’s	







being	 administered	by	 states	 that	had	 full	 diplomatic	 relations	with	only	 the	PRC.	
Since	 independence	 and	 UN	 membership,	 both	 Papua	 New	 Guinea	 and	 Western	
Samoa	have	only	recognized	the	PRC.	Micronesia	similarly	was	granted	a	seat	in	the	
UN	 with	 the	 support	 of	 the	 PRC	 in	 1991	 and	 has	 never	 recognized	 Taiwan	 as	 a	
sovereign	state.198			
	 The	 admission	 of	Bangladesh	 into	 the	UN	 further	 shows	 the	 importance	 of	
the	 Taiwan	 issue	 in	 formulating	 Beijing’s	 voting	 record.	 China	 vetoed	 S/10771	 in	




prior	 to	 their	 UN	 bid,	 Beijing	 did	 not	 support	 their	 admission	 into	 the	 UN.	 This	
pattern	of	rejecting	the	admission	of	states	that	recognize	the	ROC	is	directly	related	
to	 China’s	 policy	 of	 non-interference.	 Taiwan	 is	 perhaps	 the	 most	 sensitive	
territorial	disputed	for	the	PRC	and	supporting	Taiwan	is,	in	effect,	infringing	upon	
the	 sovereignty	 of	 Beijing	 in	 attempting	 to	 influence	 the	 affairs	 within	 its	 own	
territories.	 Thus,	 Beijing	 rejects	 any	 notion	 of	 a	 state	 infringing	 upon	 its	 own	
sovereignty	defined	by	its	interpretation	of	non-interference	policy.			
	 The	 seven	 patterns	 previously	 identified	 illustrate	 China’s	 dedication	 to	 its	
policy	of	non-interference	in	the	international	arena.	It	appears	that	Beijing	acts	in	
the	UN	with	strict	accordance	 to	 this	policy	 to	a	point	of	predictability	 in	how	the	




resolution	 given	 current	 circumstances	 around	 the	world,	 it	 appears	 that	China	 is	





In	 assessing	 the	 various	 schools	 of	 interpreting	 Sino-African	 relations,	 the	
aforementioned	 patterns	 I	 have	 established	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 each	 method	 of	
interpretation	 (Chinese	 Imperialism,	 Great	 Power	 Rivalry,	 and	 Economic	
Engagement),	providing	greater	validation	for	some	arguments	while	delegitimizing	
others.	 Although	many	 aspects	 of	 Chinese	 foreign	policy	 are	 kept	 secret,	 as	 is	 the	
case	with	nearly	every	state,	China’s	voting	record	in	the	Security	Council	and	in	the	
General	 Assembly	 does	 provide	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 insight	 to	 the	 true	 nature	 of	 Sino-






	 These	 findings	 most	 clearly	 delegitimize	 the	 argument	 that	 China	 is	 a	 an	
imperial	 power	 in	 Africa	 with	 the	 hope	 of	 establishing	 a	 modern	 empire,	 while	
providing	validation	to	the	position	that	China	is	not,	in	fact,	a	rising	imperial	power	
in	 Africa.	 As	 previously	 outlined,	 China	 appears	 to	 strictly	 adhere	 to	 its	 policy	 of	
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non-interference,	which	is	contradictory	to	empire-building.	In	other	words,	China’s	
policy	 of	 non-interference	 is	 clearly	 defined	 in	 various	 PRC	 white	 papers,	 and	
Beijing	stays	true	to	this	ideology	as	discussed	in	the	prior	section.	In	short,	Beijing’s	
foreign	policy	rhetoric	matches	the	actions	it	takes	in	reality.	In	turn,	African	leaders	




Thus,	 it	 would	 be	 difficult	 for	 one	 to	 argue	 that	 China	 is	 attempting	 to	 subject	
African	states	to	submit	to	Chinese	influence	and	essentially	become	part	of	a	Sino-
Empire.	
	 One	 can	 apply	Pattern	2:	Expanding	UN	Monitoring	Missions	to	 Sino-African	
engagements	to	illustrate	that	accusing	China	of	trying	to	establish	a	global	empire	
is	 farfetched.	 China’s	 rejection	 of	 expanding	UN	missions	 is	 entirely	 based	 on	 the	
willingness	 of	 the	 host	 state	 to	 have	 an	 augmented	 operation	 within	 its	 borders.	
Thus,	 China	 rejects	 undesired	 military	 intervention	 in	 a	 country	 and,	 therefore,	





that	 China	 is	 involved	 in	 a	 Great	 Power	 Rivalry	 against	 the	 West.	 Pattern	 1:	
Democratic	 Reforms	 and	 Free	 and	 Fair	 Elections	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 strengthen	 the	
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argument	of	those	who	believe	Chinese	policy	deliberately	challenges	the	West.	The	
primary	 goal	 of	 the	 UN	 is	 to	 enforce	 and	 protect	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 its	 Member	
States.	However,	promoting	democratic	governance	and	free	and	fair	elections	does	
not	 necessarily	 protect	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 a	 state.	 Rather,	 it	 attempts	 to	 change	 a	
state’s	 domestic	 governance	 structure	 to	 spread	 Western	 democratic	 forms	 of	




not	 support	 promoting	 democratic	 reforms	 in	 specific	 countries,	 can	 be	 used	 to	
support	 advocates	 of	 the	 pro-Great	 Power	 Rivalry	 understanding	 of	 Sino-African	
relations.	 However,	 one	 must	 remember	 that	 promoting	 any	 form	 of	 governance	
would	be	a	violation	of	Chinese	non-interference	policy.	Unfortunately,	there	are	no	
UN	resolutions	promoting	any	other	sort	of	governance,	be	it	a	monarchy,	theocracy,	
oligarchy,	 or	 one	 party	 rule,	 similar	 to	 China’s	 governance	 structure.	 If	 such	 a	
resolution	 existed,	 it	 would	 be	 far	 easier	 to	 understand	 Chinese	 intentions.	 For	
instance,	 if	 China	 supported	 a	 resolution	 that	 called	 upon	 a	 democratic	 Member	
State	to	adopt	governance	reforms	similar	to	the	Chinese	system,	one	would	be	able	
to	 quickly	 realize	 that	 China	 is	 more	 concerned	 with	 promoting	 its	 brand	 of	
governance	 around	 the	 world.	 However,	 if	 China	 rejected	 such	 a	 resolution,	 one	
could	 readily	 conclude	 that	 China	 is	 more	 concerned	 with	 following	 its	 non-
interference	policy	than	fueling	a	Great	Power	Rivalry.		
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Furthermore,	 Pattern	 5:	 Disarmament	 and	 Weapons	 Stockpiles	 clearly	
represents	the	possibility	of	Chinese	involvement	in	a	Great	Power	Rivalry.	One	key	
element	of	Chinese	global	hegemony	is	the	fact	that	the	PRC	has	a	nuclear	arsenal,	
large	 military,	 and	 long-range	 ballistic	 missile	 capabilities.	 China’s	 unwavering	
position	to	protect	its	military	capabilities,	especially	nuclear	capabilities,	 from	UN	
scrutiny	suggests	that	 it	wishes	to	continue	to	be	a	rising	nuclear	power.	If	Beijing	
were	 to	promote	policies	 in	 the	UN	 to	disarm	nuclear	warheads	 across	 the	 globe,	
one	could	more	easily	dismiss	claims	that	China	is	involved	in	a	Great	Power	Rivalry.	
However,	 in	 order	 to	militarily	 compete	with	 other	nuclear	 armed	 states,	 there	 is	
more	 incentive	 for	 China	 to	 continue	 its	 nuclear	 weapons	 program	 just	 as	 many	
Western	 powers	 do,	 including	 the	 US,	 UK,	 and	 France.	 Compromising	 China’s	
military	 could,	 therefore,	 put	 China	 in	 a	 position	 in	 which	 Western	 states	 are	
unmatched	militarily.		
	 Pattern	 7:	 Admission	 of	 States	 Supporting	 Taiwan	 is	 also	 relevant	 in	
evaluating	 the	Great	Power	Rivalry	assessment	of	 Sino-African	 relations.	Taiwan’s	
close	 relationship	 with	 Western	 powers,	 especially	 its	 economic	 and	 military	
relationship	 with	 the	 US,	 has	 been	 a	 point	 of	 contention	 for	 the	 PRC.	 Thus,	
attempting	 to	 block	 nations	 that	 recognize	 Taiwan	 from	 gaining	 a	 seat	 at	 the	 UN	







	 	There	 is	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 debate	 concerning	 the	 consequences	 of	 Chinese	
economic	 interactions	 in	 Africa.	 Essentially,	 some	 scholars	 hold	 that	 Chinese	
economic	 investments	 in	 Africa	 are	 neocolonial,	 exploitative,	 and	 heavily	
imbalanced	 in	 favor	 of	 China,	 whereas	 opponents	 of	 this	 position	 contend	 that	
Chinese	economic	actions	in	Africa	are	mostly	mutually	beneficial.	Pattern	3:	Article	
41	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 this	 ideological	 group,	 essentially	 aiding	 the	mutual	 benefits	
argument.	 By	 rejecting	 any	 notion	 of	 Article	 41	 in	 UN	 resolutions,	 China	 is	
depoliticizing	 the	 international	 economic	 mechanism	meant	 to	 punish	 states	 and	
ultimately	pressure	them	into	policy	reform.	One	would	assume	that	China	would	be	
able	to	dominate	weaker	African	states,	both	politically	and	economically.	However,	
Chinese	seems	to	be	 ‘leveling	 the	playing	 field’	by	 taking	politics	out	of	economics	






particular	 African	 states.	 Nonetheless,	 actively	 undermining	 Article	 41	 to	 more	






	 This	 chapter	 has	 shown	 that	 China’s	 policy	 of	 non-interference	 should	 be	
taken	 seriously	 and	 treated	 as	 a	 legitimate	 foreign	 policy	 doctrine	 rather	 than	
meaningless	 rhetoric	 or	 propaganda.	 Moreover,	 Beijing’s	 adherence	 to	 non-
interference	 has	 serious	 implications	 for	 the	 major	 schools	 of	 thought	 on	 Sino-
African	 relations.	 These	 findings	 undermine	 claims	 that	 China	 is	 a	 rising	 imperial	
state	or	neocolonial	power	in	Africa	while	given	further	legitimacy	to	the	argument	
that	China	is	invested	in	a	Great	Power	Rivalry	against	the	West	and	the	notion	that	
China	 is	 pursuing	 mutually	 beneficial	 relationships	 with	 African	 states.	 Although	








































countries	 behave	 similarly	 in	 their	 adherence	 to	 international	 labor	
standards	while	operating	in	Africa	
2) Mining	firms	from	developed	states	abide	by	ILO	labor	standards	nearly	






3) African	 mining	 corporations	 violate	 international	 labor	 standards	 far	
more	 than	 Chinese,	 Canadian,	 and	 other	 mining	 firms	 from	 developing	
nations	





world,	with	 the	 highest	 or	 second	 highest	 quantities	 of	 bauxite,	 cobalt,	 diamonds,	
phosphate	rocks,	platinum-group	metals,	vermiculite,	and	zirconium	in	the	world,	as	
well	 as	 containing	 an	 estimated	 40%	 of	 global	 gold	 reserves.200	As	 the	 world	
recovers	from	the	2007-2009	Global	Financial	Crisis,	the	importance	of	and	reliance	
upon	 rare	 African	 natural	 resources	 is	 becoming	 significantly	 more	 essential	 to	
global	 commodity	 production	 chains,	 including	 technological	 products,	 household	
goods,	electrical	wiring,	luxury	goods,	and	nuclear	energy.	Most	mineral	excavation	
and	 mine	 development	 on	 the	 continent	 now	 focuses	 on	 gold	 and	 diamond	
exploration	and,	given	the	rising	demand	and	prices	of	both	resources,	many	African	
states	 are	 facing	 an	 influx	 of	 revenue	 from	 the	 often	 lucrative	mining	 industry.201	
Much	of	the	mining	boom	in	Africa	can	be	contributed	to	China’s	need	for	resources	
as	 major	 Chinese	 firms,	 such	 as	 Jiangxi	 Copper	 Company,	 redirect	 global	 mining	






South	 Africa,	 Ghana,	 Zimbabwe,	 Tanzania,	 Zambia,	 and	 the	 DRC	 continue	 to	
dominate	the	African	mining	sector	while	the	extractive	industries	in	Angola,	Sierra	








such	 as	 the	American	 dollar	 and	 Chinese	 yuan,	 to	 buy	 commodities	 on	 the	 global	
market. 203 		 In	 fact,	 Sino-Zimbabwean	 mining	 relations	 have	 become	 so	




a	 benign	 developer	 or	 exploitative,	 even	 neocolonial	 power.	Much	 of	 the	 scrutiny	
directed	 at	 Chinese	 corporations	 in	 Africa	 stems	 from	 a	 2011	 report	 by	 Human	
Rights	Watch	 (HRW)	 concerning	 Chinese	 labor	 standards	 in	 the	 Zambian	 copper	
mines.	The	report	accused	the	largest	Chinese	copper	corporation	in	Zambia,	China	







punishing	 those	 who	 sought	 to	 practice	 their	 collective	 bargaining	 rights,	 and	
discriminating	 against	 Zambian	 workers	 to	 favor	 Chinese	 managers.	 The	 report	
titled,	 “You’ll	 Be	 Fired	 if	 You	Refuse,”	 is	 provocative	 in	 its	 assessment	 of	 Chinese,	
SOEs.	However,	the	scope	of	the	report	and	the	subsequent	claims	by	HRW	must	be	
addressed.	Nonetheless,	 the	2011	 report	has	been	cited	by	 scholars	 including	Yan	
Hairong	 and	 Barry	 Sautman	 as	 well	 as	 appearing	 in	 numerous	 reputable	
newspapers,	such	as	the	BBC,	Time	Magazine,	and	The	New	York	Times,	as	conclusive	
evidence	that	China	is	taking	advantage	of	African	miners.	205	
	 The	 scope	 of	 the	 report,	 in	 which	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 with	 193	
miners	 in	 Zambia’s	 copper-producing	 districts	 between	 November	 2010	 and	 July	
2011,	placed	greater	 scrutiny	on	Chinese	 firms	as	opposed	 to	other	 foreign	 firms.	
Nearly	 half	 (95)	 of	 the	 interviewees	were	 from	 Chinese-run	mines	while	 only	 48	
were	 from	 non-Chinese	 foreign-run	 mines,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 China	 is	 neither	
Zambia’s	greatest	import-export	partner	nor	biggest	investor	in	the	copper	industry.		
Moreover,	Zambia’s	state-run	mines	were	not	included	in	the	report	and	only	seven	
mining	 companies	 were	 evaluated	 in	 total,	 indicating	 that	 48	 interviewees	 were	
distributed	 amongst	 the	 six	 non-Chinese	 firms,	 averaging	 8	 interviewees	 per	
company	 as	 opposed	 to	 95	 interviewees	 working	 in	 Chinese	 mines. 206 	The	
remaining	sectors	of	Zambia’s	mining	industry	were	not	included	in	the	report.	The	






against	 international	 labor	 regulations	 in	 Zambia	 but	 also	 allowing	 or	 being	
complacent	to	other	labor	violations	and	malpractice	despite	the	fact	that	the	report	
only	 focuses	 on	 seven	 copper	 mines	 in	 Zambia.207	It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	
although	 it	 is	 preferable	 for	 mining	 companies	 to	 abide	 by	 international	 and	
domestic	regulations,	in	reality	violations	do	occur.		
	 As	 Chinese	 extractive	 corporations	 further	 deepen	 their	 ties	 with	 African	
states,	 there	 is	 the	 potential	 for	 the	 debate	 concerning	 the	 nature	 of	 Sino-African	
relations	 to	 ensue	 longer.	 This	 chapter	 seeks	 to	 determine	 the	 impact	 of	 Chinese	
corporations	in	Africa	and	assess	how	these	engagements	should	be	understood	in	
the	 context	of	 the	 leading	 interpretations	of	 Sino-African	 relations,	namely	 that	of	
Chinese	 Imperialism,	 a	 Great	 Power	 Rivalry,	 and	 Chinese	 Economic	 Engagements	
with	 Africa.	 For	 instance,	 if	 both	Western	 and	 Chinese	mining	 firms	 are	 violating	
labor	 standards	 significantly	more	 than	African	 extractive	 companies,	 this	 finding	
may	suggest	that	a	Great	Power	Rivalry	is	at	play	in	which	the	West	and	China	are	
deliberately	undermining	international	labor	regulations	to	be	more	profitable	than	
competitors.	 Conversely,	 if	 Chinese	 mining	 firms	 have	 significantly	 less	 labor	
violations	than	African	or	other	multinational	mining	companies,	this	finding	could	
indicate	 that	 China	 is	 not	 a	 neocolonial	 power	 but	 should	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 benign	
developer	 for	African	states.	My	 findings	show	that	Chinese	mining	 firms	 in	Africa	
tend	 to	 behave	 very	 similarly	 to	 other	 foreign	mining	 firms	 on	 the	 continent	 and	




that	China	may	not	be	a	neocolonial	power	 in	Africa	and	 that	China	and	 the	West	
may	not	be	using	Africa	to	wage	a	Great	Power	Rivalry.		
	 The	following	section	of	this	chapter	will	outline	the	methodology	used	in	the	
study,	 then	 evaluate	 the	 findings	 and	 what	 they	 mean	 for	 the	 major	 schools	 of	




	 In	 evaluating	 corporate	mining	 standards	 in	Africa,	 it	was	 essential	 to	 first	
determine	which	 labor	standards	to	use	 in	assessing	these	corporations.	The	most	
inclusive	 labor	 organization	 is	 the	 Internationa	 Labour	 Organisation	 (ILO),	 which	
includes	186	Member	States	as	opposed	to	the	164	Member	States	within	the	World	
Trade	Organisation	(WTO),	allowing	all	UN	Member	States	to	join	the	organization.	
Additionally,	 the	 ILO	 particularly	 specializes	 on	 international	 labor	 standards	 and	
best	practices	to	enforce	these	regulations.	Moreover,	China,	as	well	as	every	African	
country,	is	a	member	to	the	ILO.	Within	the	ILO,	which	was	created	in	1919	as	part	
of	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Versailles,	 there	 are	 numerous	 conventions	 outlining	 labor	
standards.208 	However,	 most	 states	 hold	 reservations	 to	 at	 least	 one	 of	 these	
conventions,	making	 the	 choice	 of	which	 labor	 standards	 to	 use	 as	 a	 baseline	 for	
corporate	evaluation	exceedingly	difficult.	Also	due	to	the	heterogeneous	nature	of	






As	 a	 result,	 I	 found	 it	 to	 appropriate	 to	 use	 the	 1998	 ILO	 Declaration	 of	
Fundamental	Principles	and	Rights	at	Work	 (ILO	Declaration	 from	 here	 forth)	 as	 a	












To	 constitute	 a	 labor	 violation,	 I	 deemed	 it	 necessary	 to	 find	 no	 less	 than	
three	different	media	stories	or	NGO	reports	citing	the	same	alleged	labor	violation	
by	a	specific	mining	firm.	Violations	ranged	from	labor	strikes	instigated	by	a	lack	of	
safety	 and	 health	 standards,	 in	 which	 some	 firms	 were	 illegally	 mining	 without	








	 After	 establishing	 a	 basis	 against	 which	 different	 corporations	 were	
evaluated,	 it	 was	 necessary	 to	 compile	 a	 list	 that	 best	 represented	 the	 major	
extraction	companies	active	 in	Africa,	 keeping	 in	mind	 the	geographic	diversity	of	
where	the	companies	have	operations	in	Africa,	total	revenue	flows,	etc.	Due	to	the	
scope	of	this	project,	I	chose	to	focus	this	study	on	the	mining	industry	in	Africa	as	a	
result	 of	 the	 intense	 criticism	 Chinese	 mining	 companies	 have	 faced	 on	 the	
continent	in	the	past	decade	and	especially	within	the	past	five	years.		Additionally,	
the	importance	of	mining	to	Beijing	is	clear	in	that	by	2011,	mining	was	the	second	
largest	 sector	 in	 terms	 of	 total	 global	 stock	 of	 Chinese	 outward	 FDI,	 totaling	
US$66,995,370,000	 of	 aggregate	 global	 investment	 out	 of	 a	 total	 of	
US$424,780,670,000	in	outward	Chinese	investments.210		
	 There	were	a	number	of	barriers	in	creating	such	as	list.	First,	a	lack	of	both	
governmental	 transparency	of	SOEs	as	well	as	a	 lack	of	 transparency	 from	private	
companies	made	 it	 difficult	 to	 determine	 exactly	which	 companies	were	 active	 in	
which	parts	of	the	continent	as	well	as	determining	the	revenue	stream	and	political	
prowess	 of	 the	 company.	 Moreover,	 the	 relative	 novelty,	 since	 the	mid	 2000s,	 of	
Africa’s	 resource	 boom	became	 increasingly	 apparent	 given	 the	 lack	 of	 legitimate	
reporting	on	revenues,	profits,	and	cost	of	operations.	Underreporting	or	a	failure	to	











comparing	 Canadian	 and	 Chinese	 firms	 could	 prove	 to	 be	 useful	 in	 testing	 the	
legitimacy	 of	 public	 assumptions	 concerning	 how	 closely	 both	 countries	 follow	
labor	standards.	These	lists	could	then	be	used	in	a	comparative	method	to	evaluate	
if	different	firms	act	uniquely	in	regards	to	international	labor	standards	in	Africa’s	
mining	 sector.	 For	 instance,	 it	 would	 be	 possible	 to	 determine	 if	 African	 mining	




















Most	mining	 firms	 included	 international	 labor	 standards	on	 their	home	websites	
and	 ways	 in	 which	 they	 are	 promoting	 these	 standards,	 however,	 there	 was	
ultimately	 no	 information	 on	 any	 malpractice	 and	 labor	 violations	 from	 these	
companies	 (understandably	 so).	 Thus,	 newspapers,	 predominately	 local	 African	
newspapers,	 became	 the	 primary	 source	 for	 evaluating	 whether	 a	 company	 had	
violated	 the	 ILO	Declaration.	Without	 the	ability	 to	 conduct	 fieldwork,	widespread	
interviews	with	laborers,	and	a	lack	of	on-the-ground	fieldwork	from	the	ILO,	there	




rights	 also	 contained	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 information	 and	 field	 analysis	 of	 potential	
violations.	 Therefore,	 local	 African	 newspapers	 and	 detailed	 reports	 from	 leading	












Finding	1:	Mining	 firms	 from	developed	countries	and	mining	 firms	 from	developing	
countries	behave	 similarly	 in	 their	adherence	 to	 international	 labor	 standards	while	
operating	in	Africa	
	
The	 fact	 that	 mining	 firms	 originating	 from	 both	 the	 developed	 and	
developing	 world	 did	 not	 have	 significant	 differences	 in	 how	 they	 follow	
international	 labor	standards	has	a	number	of	 implications.	When	considering	 the	
legitimacy	behind	 a	Great	Power	Rivalry	 from	 these	data,	 at	 first	 glance,	 one	may	
argue	 that	 because	 there	 are	 few	 differences	 in	 labor	 violations	 between	 both	
categorizations	 of	 companies	 then	 there	 certainly	 is	 not	 a	 Great	 Power	Rivalry	 at	
play.	This	assumption	is	based	on	the	fact	that	it	does	not	appear	that	one	group	is	
actively	 violating	 more	 labor	 standards	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 undermine	 other	 powers.	
However,	 I	 acknowledge	 that	 this	 finding	 could,	 in	 fact,	 support	 evidence	 that	 a	
Great	Power	Rivalry	may	be	at	play.	For	instance,	nearly	half,	a	staggering	number,	
of	 the	 mining	 firms	 evaluated	 from	 both	 developed	 and	 developing	 states	 have	
violated	the	ILO	Declaration	since	2000.	This	reality	could	suggest	that	perhaps	both	
developed	 and	 developing	 states	 are	 actively	working	 to	 undermine	 one	 another,	
thus	 explaining	 why	 such	 a	 high	 number	 of	 firms	 have	 violated	 ILO	 standards.	
Firm	 Country	
Origin	





Developed		 11	 14	 44%	 56%	
Developing	 12	 13	 48%	 52%	
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However,	it	is	also	possible	that	these	firms	are	seeking	to	maximize	profits	and	ILO	
standards	 decrease	 efficiency,	 thus	 decreasing	 profits.	 Therefore,	 mining	 firms	 in	
Africa	may	 intentionally	 attempt	 to	 circumvent	 ILO	 standards	 to	 cut	 expenditures	
and	maximize	revenues.	Although	these	data	could	potentially	be	used	by	pro-Great	
Power	 Rivalry	 advocates	 and	 those	 who	 believe	 there	 is	 no	 Great	 Power	 Rivalry	
occurring	 in	Africa,	 illuminating	 the	 common	struggle	of	how	 to	 interpret	data	on	
Sino-African	affairs.	I	believe	the	second	finding,	which	is	discussed	on	the	following	






























China	 8	 7	 53.3%	
Canada	 9	 6	 60%	
Africa	 14	 6	 70%	










mining	 firms	 performed	 better	 than	 any	 other	 categorization,	 except	 for	 that	 of	
firms	from	developing	states	(excluding	Africa	and	China),	I	am	lead	to	believe	that	
these	data	have	 great	 significance	 for	 those	who	 believe	 that	 China	 is	 neocolonial	
power	 in	 Africa,	 exploiting	 African	 resources	 and	 laborers	 to	 benefit	 Beijing.	
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Exploitation	can	be	a	biased	and	unclear	term	to	define	and	even	more	difficult	 to	
measure.	 However,	 using	 the	 percent	 of	 labor	 violations	 by	 African-based	mining	
firms	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 comparing	 Chinese	 labor	 violations,	 Africa	 being	 where	 the	
alleged	 exploitation	 is	 occurring	 by	 Beijing,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 Chinese	 firms	 are	
adhering	to	ILO	standards	much	more	than	African	firms.	Additionally,	despite	that	






revenue,	and	considering	 the	 large	scale	of	most	mining	companies,	especially	 the	
firms	 selected	 for	 this	 study,	 mining	 companies	 traditionally	 maintain	 close	
relations	with	their	home	country’s	government.	Thus,	governments	may	intervene	
to	 protect	 their	 investments	 from	 foreign	 exploitation.	 For	 instance,	 research	 has	
shown	 that	 both	 Beijing	 and	 Washington	 have	 been	 involved	 in	 promoting	 and	









Thus,	media	outlets	may	 feel	 less	 inclined	 to	 investigate	potential	 labor	violations	
based	on	the	assumption	that	 if	a	violation	were	to	occur,	 the	Canadian	 free	press	
would	immediately	bring	forth	the	problem.	However,	while	a	domestic	audience	is	
important	 in	 checking	 and	 balancing	 the	 activities	 of	 firms	 invested	 in	 lucrative	
industries,	 such	 as	 mining,	 and	 while	 China’s	 closed	 press	 may	 potentially	 allow	
Chinese	 firms	 to	 avoid	 the	 same	 amount	 of	 scrutiny	 and	 oversight	 that	 Canadian	




Western	 NGOs	 have	 seemingly	 taken	 upon	 itself	 themselves	 to	 investigate	 and	
attempt	to	uncover	Chinese	labor	violations	in	Africa.		
A	 second	 indication	 from	 these	 data	 is	 that	 an	 intentionally	 planned	 Great	
Power	Rivalry	may	be	an	illegitimate	assumption	concerning	Chinese	engagements	
in	 Africa.	 One	 would	 assume	 that	 Western	 and	 Chinese	 mining	 firms,	 if	 a	 Great	
Power	 Rivalry	 dictated	 Chinese	 policy	 in	 Africa,	 would	 be	 violating	 international	
labor	 regulations	 more	 regularly	 than	 any	 other	 categorization.	 A	 Great	 Power	
Rivalry	 suggests	 that	 global	 powers	 are	 actively	 working	 to	 undermine	 the	
objectives	 of	 the	 other	 powers.	 However,	 Western-based	 and	 Chinese	 firms	
essentially	 only	 performed	 worse	 than	 developing	 countries	 and	 also	 performed	













	 This	 finding	 is	 perhaps	 the	 most	 applicable	 in	 determining	 the	 legitimacy	
behind	 accusations	 that	 China	 is	 invested	 in	 a	 Great	 Power	 Rivalry	 as	 well	 as	
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also	 suggests	 that	 China	 should	 not	 be	 solely	 viewed	 as	 a	 neocolonial	 power	 in	
Africa.	Based	on	the	data,	 it	does	not	appear	that	the	CPC	is	seeking	to	undermine	
international	 labor	 regulations	 any	 more	 than	 the	 five	 largest	 Chinese	 private	
mining	firms	operating	throughout	the	continent.	If	Beijing	were	to	be	intentionally	
attempting	 to	 exploit	 African	 countries	 and	 labor,	 one	 could	 assume	 that	 there	
would	be	a	major	increase	in	the	proportionality	of	violations	by	SOEs	as	opposed	to	
privately	operated	firms.		
	 Additionally,	 these	 data	 have	 significant	 indications	 for	 the	 argument	 that	
China	may	 not	 be	 a	 neocolonial	 power	 in	Africa.	 One	would	 expect	 that	 if	 Beijing	
were	to	be	executing	a	plan	to	exploit	the	economies	of	African	states,	making	them	
dependent	 on	 China’s	 ‘know	 how’	 for	 future	 success,	 then	 SOE’s	 adherence	 to	
international	labor	standards	would	be	different	than	that	of	privately	run	Chinese	
companies.	For	instance,	Chinese	SOEs	may	feel	protected	by	their	government	and	
be	 more	 likely	 to	 ignore	 international	 labor	 standards.	 Conversely,	 there	 is	 the	
possibility	that	Chinese	SOEs	may	also	adhere	to	international	labor	standards	more	
than	 privately	 owned	 firms	 in	 order	 to	 responsibly	 represent	 Beijing	 abroad.	
However,	 because	 both	 Chinese	 SOEs	 and	 private	 mining	 firms	 followed	 labor	






Investigating	Chinese	 labor	abuses	 in	 the	African	mining	sector	can	also	be	
reinterpreted	through	non-interference.	Non-interference,	based	on	the	5	Principles	
outlined	in	Chapter	2,	which	include	having	mutually	beneficial	relations	with	states	
and	 peaceful	 coexistence,	 could	 be	 delegitimized	 if	 China	 was	 found	 to	 be	
systematically	taking	advantage	of	African	laborers	and	methodically	violating	labor	
rights.	 Conversely,	 this	 study	 gives	 greater	 legitimacy	 to	 non-interference	 as	 an	











actions	 in	 Africa	 should	 not	 be	 quickly	 dismissed	 as	 exploitative	 and	 neocolonial.	
This	 empirical	 study	 and	 analysis	 hopes	 to	 set	 the	 tone	 for	 future	 research,	
especially	in	finding	ways	to	measure	the	impacts	of	Chinese	interactions	in	Africa.	
Furthermore,	 this	 study	 contributes	 to	 the	 legitimacy	 behind	 China’s	 non-
interference	policy	and	this	policy,	by	turn,	must	be	taken	seriously.	Nonetheless,	as	
	 92	
China	 continues	 to	 grow	 and	 Africa	 continues	 to	 export	 resources	 to	 world,	 the	

































	 Sino-African	relations	will	 continue	 to	 impact	global	power	 trends	as	China	
continues	to	actively	engage	with	African	states.	This	thesis	has	contributed	to	the	
debate	 concerning	 the	nature	of	 Sino-African	affairs	 in	 a	number	of	distinct	ways.	
First,	 the	 three	dominant	 schools	of	understanding	Chinese	actions	 in	Africa	were	
outlined	 and	 explained	 in-depth,	 they	 include:	 Chinese	 Imperialism,	 Great	 Power	
Rivalry,	 and	 Economic	 Engagement.	 However,	 the	 flaws	 within	 these	
categorizations,	 namely	 that	 of	 researchers	 treating	 them	 as	 mutually	 exclusive,	
have	resulted	in	the	misinterpretation	of	evidence	and	researchers	interpreting	the	
same	 evidence	 to	 argue	 in	 support	 of	 different	 schools	 of	 Sino-African	 thought.	
Making	evidence	‘fit’	within	the	confines	of	one	school	of	thought	is	an	overarching	
issue	in	analyzing	China-Africa	area	studies.	
	 Perhaps	 the	 most	 provocative	 ideal	 this	 thesis	 raises	 is	 that	 Sino-African	
relations	 can	 be	 best	 interpreted	 through	 China’s	 policy	 of	 non-interference.	
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the	 validity	 of	 the	 three	 main	 schools	 of	 Sino-African	 thought.	 For	 instance,	 if	
Chinese	 non-interference	 policy	 is	 publically	 made,	 followed	 by	 Beijing,	 and	
accepted	 by	 African	 states,	 it	 is	 more	 difficult	 to	 argue	 that	 China	 is	 an	 imperial	
power	in	Africa.		
	 One	goal	of	this	thesis	was	to	also	illustrate	the	importance	of	using	empirical	
data	 to	 evaluate	 the	 consequences	 of	 China’s	 relations	with	African	 states.	 Rather	




Future	 researchers	 should	 be	 cognizant	 of	 backing	 their	 claims	 with	
empirical	 data	 and	 avoid	making	 predetermined	 assumptions	 concerning	 Chinese	
intentions	in	Africa.	Although	Sino-African	area	studies	is	a	fairly	new	discipline,	 it	
has	 the	 potential	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 areas	 of	 scholarship	 in	
understanding	 international	 relations	 in	 the	 21st	 century.	 Perhaps	 China’s	 robust	
engagement	with	African	states	will	usher	in	a	new	era	of	South-South	cooperation,	
in	which	Beijing	can	rival	US	global	supremacy.	Or,	 it	may	be	true	that	 the	US	and	
China	 find	 common	 ground	 in	 Africa,	 considering	 that	 both	 powers	 have	 similar	
goals	of	ensuring	stability	 in	 the	continent	 to	 foster	economic	development.	 If	 this	
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assertion	 is	 true,	 China	 and	 the	 US	 may	 work	 more	 closely	 together,	 alleviating	
growing	 tensions	 between	 the	 two	 powers.	 However,	 the	 consequences	 of	 a	
potential	 Sino-American	 alliance	 in	 Africa	 in	 still	 unclear	 for	 both	 African	
governments	and	African	people	themselves.	Nonetheless,	China’s	engagement	with	
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